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Abstract 
As a citizen of Ukraine I am concerned about the prosperity of my home country. In 
this thesis I define the biggest obstacles for Ukraine’s development in a prospect of a 
cross-country analysis. My main concern is that corruption is the biggest problem in 
Ukraine. I believe that corruption prevents the development of the country through its 
negative impact on private sector activity. 
With this thesis I want to point out what Ukraine should take into consideration in 
order to eliminate corruption based on the experience of other countries. For this reason I 
primarily observe what drives corruption among countries. Secondly, I examine whether 
corruption affects business equally in all countries and what other factors are important for 
business development worldwide. Therefore, this thesis is based on the corruption facts 
observed in Ukraine and the results are obtained using the fixed effects method in the panel 
data. 
The main findings indicate that the most significant drivers of corruption in all 
countries are lack of judicial autonomy and weak competition among political parties. 
Corruption did not show any significant impact on business formation until 2SLS estimator 
was applied. Hence, there is a weak causal effect that runs from corruption to business 
formation, meaning that in countries with lower corruption business activity is higher. In 
addition, availability of financial resources, less complex tax systems and more years of 
compulsory education are found to be positively associated with business activity. 
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1. Introduction 
The topic of this thesis is related to the situation in Ukraine, my home country. 
Ukraine's level of development places it to the group of “Lower middle income” countries 
(The World Bank) in spite of its huge potential for better development. In accordance with 
economic literature, one of countries' economic growth engines is business, thereby 
countries may be poor if conditions for doing business are hostile (Djankov et al., 2000). 
As often mentioned in various publications (The Global Competitiveness Report 
2013–2014; PWC, 2013b) Ukraine has good opportunities for private sector development 
due to its large domestic market size, highly educated human capital, big variety of natural 
resources, physical size of the country and its convenient geographic location. Successfully 
running business at some point makes country's level of economic development higher. So 
what is the problem with business in Ukraine? A number of publications state that the 
biggest obstacle for doing business is corruption and there is recent evidence of it from 
Ukraine. 
The events that happened on Maidan square in Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, in the 
end of 2013 are known world-wide. The primal reason of protests was people’s 
dissatisfaction in the fact that Ukrainian ex-president Yanukovych refused to sign up 
Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union. Further, violent 
government attempts to stop the activists have led to another more important reason to 
continue the protests – the struggle against highly corrupted Ukrainian government. 
Ukrainian entrepreneurs, who are affected by corruption the most, joined the protests 
as well. They complain that conditions for small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs) 
have been worsening within the last years, especially because of the government policies. 
In contrast, big businesses in Ukraine owned by politicians or oligarchs continue 
successful development. 
The effect of corruption on business activity is observed through bribing and 
extortion. In the first case the entrepreneurs prefer to rather bribe public officials due to a 
complexity in business legislation as following all the rules may end up in bankruptcy. As 
a consequence, bribing in a long run leads to extortion from the officials and applies to 
even those entrepreneurs who do not want to violate any law. Moreover, corrupt practices 
in the form of patronage or nepotism offers a number of benefits for definite entrepreneurs 
forcing others out of competition. In addition, corrupt actions are considered to be also 
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those that take place inside a company without any involvement of public officials. This 
type of corruption is called embezzlement or theft of company’s assets. All in all, the first 
three forms of corruption are the ones Ukrainian entrepreneurs have been extensively 
fighting with. However, the conflict has arisen mostly because of economic, legal and 
political uncertainties in the country that cause corruption. 
Knowledge of the sources of corruption and the impact of corruption on the business 
life has a great importance for Ukraine’s development. The topic of corruption in 
Ukrainian business is of current importance but as far as I know there are not many 
empirical studies that observe this issue from such a perspective. For the reason that the 
analysis of only one country would not provide decisive results, my goal is to make a 
general cross-country analysis over the period of 2005-2013 in order to find whether the 
factors observed in Ukraine are common for other countries as well. In particular, I am 
focusing on the following questions: 
1) What are the drivers of corruption among countries? 
2) Does corruption harm business and what other factors have impact on business 
worldwide? 
However, before answering these questions I suggest to observe the theoretical 
aspects of corruption – its official definitions, forms of corruption in business and the ways 
to measure corruption. The third chapter of this thesis reviews the literature on the causes 
of corruption and the relationship between corruption and business. The expected 
outcomes of the influencing factors are presented in a number of hypotheses. The forth 
chapter describes two econometric models, data and methodological approach. The fifth 
chapter provides the econometric results for the panel data analysis. The final chapter 
concludes about the lessons Ukraine can take from the cross-country findings. 
  
3 
 
2. What is corruption, how it is related to business activity and how it 
can be measured? 
2.1. Definitions of corruption 
An etymology dictionary explains that the noun “corruption” was first used in the 
14
th
 century. The origin of this word comes from Latin “corruptus” (past participle of 
“corrumpere”) meaning “to destroy, to spoil” whereas “rumpere” is “to break”. 
Various definitions of corruption are used in the literature. The most popular one 
belongs to Nye who explains corruption as “behavior that deviates from the formal duties 
of a public role (elective or appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close 
family, private clique) wealth or status gains” (Andvig, 2006). 
Nowadays Transparency International, The World Bank and The International 
Monetary Fund use a standard definition of corruption as “the abuse of public office for 
private gains”. Furthermore, the World Bank identified corruption as “the only significant 
obstacle in the economic and social development” because it undermines the rule of law 
and weakens the institutional foundations on which sustainable development depends. 
Moreover, Transparency International states that corruption hurts everyone who depends 
on the integrity of people in a position of authority. 
In the Civil Law Convention on Corruption (article 2) Council of Europe defines 
corruption as “requesting, offering, giving or accepting, directly or indirectly, a bribe or 
any other undue advantage or prospect thereof, which distorts the proper performance of 
any duty or behaviour required of the recipient of the bribe, the undue advantage or the 
prospect thereof”. 
In contrast, Macrae (1982) identifies corruption as “an arrangement that involves an 
exchange between two parties (the demander and the supplier) which (i) has an influence 
on the allocation of resources either immediately or in the future; and (ii) involves the use 
or abuse of public or collective responsibility for private ends”. Besides, Osoba (1996) 
states: “corruption as an anti-social behaviour conferring improper benefits contrary to 
legal and normal norms and which undermines the authorities’ capacity to secure the 
welfare of all citizens”. And finally, a narrower definition that is especially suitable for the 
topic of this thesis is suggested by Ahlin (2001). He explains corruption as the extra fees or 
bribes that must be paid by entrepreneurs in order to operate an official business. 
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2.2. Forms of corruption in business 
Corruption in business is quite a common element. Some forms of corruption are 
usual and involuntary accepted, so they are even dealt as the price of doing business. 
Segraves comments in her article that the cost of corruption is often passed to consumers, 
and it stifles competition and subverts the free market. 
Additionally, Gray et al. (2004) admit that it is not easy to estimate the levels of 
corruption experienced by all firms in the country as a whole. For this reason, the only 
analysis that could be conducted is a comparison of the types and levels of corruption 
encountered by different types of firms across countries (e.g. small or large, private or 
state-owned, new or old). 
In line with OECD (2013), there are several categories of different actions of abusing 
public office for corruption and they help to understand how corruption is related to 
business. The concept includes four broad categories of human action: bribery, extortion, 
patronage and theft of public assets. In accordance with The Global Infrastructure Anti-
Corruption Centre, all types of corruption are considered as criminal offence in most 
jurisdictions. 
2.2.1. Bribery 
Bribery is by far the most widespread form of corruption in business. Bribery occurs 
in the private sector and it consists of payments by individuals or firms to public officials 
in order to influence administrative decisions under their responsibility (OECD, 2013). 
From an ethical point of view bribes are considered to be as “evil” in most cultures, 
empasizes Verhezen (2009 : 119-172) in his book. Bribers and bribees either try to explain 
bribes as “gifts” or hide them from public, as they are illegal and immoral in most of the 
countries. The bribee tries to make public believe that the “gift” is offered only as a sign of 
appreciation. 
Verhezen (2009) states: “a bribe is a “gift” or a payment presented by a briber who 
expects a special consideration in return, one that is specifically incompatible with the 
duties of the bribee's role”. In comparison to a gift, the bribe is a payment for a definite 
service which remains secret. For instance, many multinational companies limit the 
monetary value of sincere gifts at a value less than USD100 to distinguish them from 
possible bribes. Anything exceeding that value limit is automatically considered as an 
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internal offense against the ethical procedure. 
Bribery is understood as dishonest behavior due to its violation of trust in politicians, 
business relations and bureaucrats. The temptation to sell something which is forbidden 
provides a base for the bribery; hence, everything has its price. Bribes sometimes referred 
to as "grease" money. Moreover, Segraves explains in her article that small businesses may 
bribe larger companies to get contracts, and in newly developed countries small businesses 
may have to provide additional payments to local utilities in order to receive phone service 
and electricity. 
Bribery usually takes place when a bribee has some monopoly power on imperfect 
market and there no appropriate rules on it. Bribers tend to offer bribes in order to obtain 
unfair or undeserved benefits or to solicit reductions in socio-economic costs. While giving 
and receiving bribes three possible kinds of thresholds may be ignored (Griffin, 1997; 
Verhezen, 2009): 
a) An entrusted reputation of integrity; 
b) Social norms of accountability and moral responsibility; 
c) Legal rules of an institutionalized judicial system. 
Bribery is based on reciprocal relationship in which trust is a mandatory element. In 
this case trust does not mean that a person is trustworthy, trust is just a way to deal with 
uncertainty (Verhezen, 2009). Nonetheless, the trust between the corruptor and the 
corruptee does not build a warm alliance. In countries where legal enforcement or efficient 
institutions are absent deals are often facilitated by personalized relations. Hence, informal 
trust and its related networking become more important, though the sides of this kind of 
relationship do not wish to be socially recognized. After the materialization of the service 
both will exit the relationship, but later a similar exchange may be repeated under the same 
circumstances. The money invested into a bribe usually gives a return immediately. 
In accordance with Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2002), bribery becomes more 
obvious in the economies of transition because institutions are not functioning well, and 
also modernization has caused a degradation of strong traditional social rules and moral 
norms. Defenders of bribery hold the position that bribery has appeared in conditions 
where government does not work efficiently, so public officials remain underpaid and 
unmotivated. From this point of view the incentives for bribes are high and the short term 
benefits seem obvious (Verhezen, 2009). 
What is more, Olson et al. (1998) point out that low-level official corruption could 
improve overall efficiency, but yet not many bribes have positive effects because of 
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possible tax evasion, violation of environmental rules, certification of unqualified people, 
organized crime etc. Rose-Ackerman (1978) argues that if bribes have a valid resource 
allocation function, they should be legalized and the fees must be public, otherwise, illegal 
payments make market inefficient. 
Nowadays bribery has become an instrument of money exchange that satisfies the 
greed or desire of people who are multiplying their wealth or socio-political power. They 
do not try to create a “common good”, instead, gift objects are used only for private benefit 
which shows the real character of the bribe. Furthermore, corrupt officials benefiting from 
bribes may redesign their activity by creating scarcity, delays or red tapes in order to 
encourage bribery (Verhezen, 2009). Due to bribery unfair competition undermines the 
morality of “fair players” and destroys the market system. Bribery weakens the social 
contract between agent and principal, and thus, jeopardizes the functions of public office. 
As a consequence, bribery destructs any form of good reputation. 
Furthermore, Verhezen (2009) indicates that bribery and corruption are the diseases 
of cooperative social order. They lead to a loss of enormous amounts of public revenues 
from taxes, custom duties and privatization programs. Moreover, income inequality caused 
by illegal redistribution of funds or state activities is also a result of bribery and corruption. 
In spite of it, the level of bribery is not a critical variable as long as the economic growth 
rate is able to absorb the inefficient cost of corruption. 
However, bribery should be distinguished from extortion, as the latter one includes 
harm to another person, when the former represents a desire to influence (Verhezen, 2009). 
Nevertheless, bribery and extortion are the opposite ends of the same problem (OECD, 
2000). Some could argue that there is nothing immoral when giving a bribe for more 
efficient job of public servant, it could be even considered as “tips”. Yet, in Verhezen's 
(2009) opinion such system of “tips” could easily lead to extortion. 
2.2.2. Extortion 
Extortion is defined as an act of threatening harm to another person in order to obtain 
benefits to which one has no prior rights (Verhezen, 2009). Legal dictionary defines 
extortion as “the obtaining of property from another induced by wrongful use of actual or 
threatened force, violence, or fear, or under colour of official right”. Under the Common 
Law, extortion is “a misdemeanour consisting of an unlawful taking of money by a 
government officer”. 
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There are four basic ways in which a public officer commits extortion (Legal 
dictionary): 
a) Extortion usually appears when an official demands a payment or a gift for services 
of his duty which have no official fees; 
b) A government officer takes a fee that is higher than allowed by law; 
c) A public officer asks to receive a fee before it is due; 
d) An official takes a fee for services that are not performed. 
The Global Infrastructure Anti-Corruption Centre states that extortion may 
constitute, for example, refusal to provide customs clearance for equipment or materials, or 
refusal to make payments or issue certificates that are due. If the victim of extortion 
provides the payment or other benefit, it will normally become liable for the offence of 
bribery. 
Some types of extortion threats are aimed to harm the victim's business. Extortion is 
a real problem and a current-day crime for many small business owners, emphasizes Davis 
in his article. Internet-related extortion may occur as a number of small entrepreneurs are 
doing more and more businesses online, consequently the cyber-criminals are following 
the trail. Davis additionally notes that sometimes extortion is reported as an attempt against 
business people who receive e-mails with their customer information attached. The 
extortionists demand money in exchange of not exposing commercial information to 
competitors and customers themselves. The crimes can be committed by hacker-cyber-
criminals or even by a dishonest employee. 
In fact, the concepts of extortion and facilitation payments can overlap, and the terms 
are sometimes used to describe the same occurrence. Nevertheless, the literature on law 
enforcement has identified extortion possibilities as the key obstacle to successful control 
of corruption (Mishra and Mookherjee, 2012). 
2.2.3. Patronage 
Patronage is usually a financial support that is given to an organization or activity by 
a provider of patronage, namely patron. According to OECD (2013), “corruption in the 
form of patronage (sometimes called favouritism, nepotism, clientelism) consists of the 
preferential treatment of firms and/or individuals by public officials regarding the 
compliance with government rules for the allocation of government contracts or transfer 
payments”. 
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Green and Ward (2004) define that in business conditions public officials do a favour 
to a private company by “bending” the rules, and the latter one gives a gift to the official in 
return. As Rose-Ackerman (1999 : 105) comments, in clientelistic states it is unclear to 
separate whether the government or private sector dominates, because they both work for 
mutual gain. 
In some countries patronage groups have formed a hierarchy where payoffs are 
shared from lower to higher ranks and otherwise (Rose-Ackerman, 1999 : 106). In 
addition, personal connections play an important role in patronage and many private 
business relations rely on trust and reputation to assure qualitative performance. 
Rose-Ackerman further asserts that a close personal link between private entities and 
public officials often undermines the transparency and effectiveness of both public and 
private institutions. Moreover, personalized ties will limit the entry to the market for new 
competitors. 
Quite often patronage is focused on big business interests, like in state-owned 
enterprises where a state is the main customer. In this case government procurement 
contracts are given away to a specified company without any competition. 
In many developing countries credit and banking services are a common source of 
patronage and corruption. The elite groups who control financial resources usually have 
close links to the government, so they can influence upcoming reforms or rules (Rose-
Ackerman, 1999 : 110). Moreover, clientelism is provided to businesses also in exchange 
of political votes. Moreover, in the developed countries patronage is common among 
municipal parties and constituencies (Jamal, 2007 : 15). As a result, the long-run 
consequences of patronage are so profound that it complicates the creation of effective 
state and private institutions. 
2.2.4. Embezzlement 
Investopedia defines embezzlement as “a form of white-collar crime where a person 
misappropriates the assets entrusted to him or her”. In this type of fraud the assets are 
attained lawfully and the embezzler has the right to possess them, but the assets are then 
used for unintended purposes. Similarly, Rose-Ackerman (1978 : 6-7) explains 
embezzlement as an act when a member of a company uses his or her rights to make 
decisions concerning access to information or some tangible assets of the company for 
personal advantages in ways that are either illegal or against the company’s aims or rules. 
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A business journalist Ray in her article presents an argument to emphasize the 
difference between embezzlement and stealing. She explains that embezzlement is done 
from the inside, and it involves stealing resources that were meant to be protected by the 
hired person. As a result, the most commonly embezzlement is done by employees or 
others with fiduciary responsibility. Embezzlement challenges the property rights of the 
organization, including the proper internal allocation of decision making rights (Andvig, 
2006 : 282). A company owner can lose a great amount of money before even suspecting 
that embezzlement is going on. 
In accordance with Legal Information Institute, embezzlement can involve not only 
taking large amounts of goods or money from a company at once but also taking small 
amounts of money over time. Sometimes company managers under-report the income to 
their supervisors and keep the difference. Undoubtedly, income reported to tax officials 
does not illustrate the real picture; as a consequence, embezzlement involves income tax 
evasion. 
Embezzlement is a common problem, and it can have serious negative effects on the 
businesses that fall victim to it. The way how embezzlement affects business is explained 
by Ray and listed below: 
a) Business suffers direct losses due to a shortage of money or other assets. In 
particular, new or small businesses are affected the most; 
b) Overcharging customers in order to get the resources of the company makes the 
business appear incompetent; 
c) The secrecy required for embezzlement prevents honest and open working business 
relationships. 
Some ways how to protect business from embezzlement are mentioned in Bianco’s 
article. In his opinion, companies need to develop a program to recognize signs of 
employee fraud, for instance examination of source documents. Besides, internal controls 
may prevent embezzlement, for example, segregating duties, regular or programmed 
transfers of employees from department to department, and mandatory vacations. Finally, a 
usual sign of embezzlement includes anything out of the ordinary, such as unexplained 
inventory shortages, larger than usual purchases, significantly higher or lower account 
balances, excessive cash shortages or surpluses etc. 
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2.3. Measuring corruption 
According to Rotberg (2009 : 50-51), academic literature on corruption dates back 
several decades, but the specific topic of how to measure corruption came into focus in the 
late 70’s. Rotberg adds that the methodologies in corruption measurement field were 
developed without a clear sense of what they were actually measuring. 
The illegal nature of corruption makes it a covert activity. For this reason accurate 
data on corruption is hard to obtain and many of those who are involved may distort or 
falsify the information they provide. In this case biases or errors are unavoidable 
(Sampford et al., 2006 : 16). 
In the mid 90’s economists began to use business firm surveys of the victims of 
corruption and other opinion polls as proxies for corruption measurement to explore the 
correlations and the causality between corruption and various dependent variables, states 
Rotberg (2009). Some of the first measures of corruption were provided by Transparency 
International and the World Bank in 1995 and 1996 consequently. 
The most established and widely-used corruption indices are Corruption Perception 
Index and Control of Corruption. They rely on subjective data, where experience based 
instruments are devoted to survey peoples’ or experts’ perception of corruption in the 
public or private sector (Malito, 2014). 
However, a measurement system or a perfect index that could accurately account for 
actual levels of corruption for cross-national comparisons still does not exist (Rohwer, 
2009; Aidt, 2010). Accordingly, no single indicator can capture the full complexity of the 
corruption phenomenon. As a result, it is more valuable to use a combination of tools 
rather than single indicators, suggests Rohwer (2009). 
2.3.1. Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
Corruption Perception Index is an annual corruption survey-based index compiled 
since 1995 by Transparency International (TI). CPI is the most widely used indicator of 
corruption for a cross section of countries. The number of countries nowadays covered by 
CPI is around 170 which was much smaller in the earlier periods. In accordance with TI, 
CPI is a “combination of surveys and assessments of corruption, collected by a variety of 
reputable institutions”. In some studies CPI is explained as “an ad-hoc measure of 
corruption aiming to provide data on extensive perceptions of corruption within countries” 
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(Lambsdorff, 2007; Malito, 2014). 
TI defines that the aim of CPI is to raise the public awareness of corruption not only 
in order to press governments to care about corruption, but also to help civil society to 
demand accountability from their leaders. CPI focuses on the corruption in the public 
sector and its main idea is to spread the understanding of real levels of corruption and show 
how it differs from one country to another (Lambsdorff, 2007 : 20-22). 
CPI uses data sources from independent institutions specializing in governance and 
business climate analysis. A list of sources that enter the index must meet two essential 
conditions
1
. In addition, the data from sources must cover the last two years from surveys. 
As a rule, countries are included in the CPI when they have at least three sources available. 
To rescale the data from each source and to standardize it into averaged CPI is the 
most challenging tasks. Until 2012 CPI standardization method employed a two-step 
standardization model based on the techniques of matching percentiles and applying a 
beta-transformation (Rohwer, 2009). 
A matching percentiles technique was used for placing the sources into a common 
scale. This technique processed country ranks on each source and it was useful for 
combining sources that had different distributions. It also allowed all reported scores to 
remain within the CPI bounds [0, 10] (Saisana and Saltelli, 2012). As a result, the largest 
value in the CPI was taken as the standardized value for the country ranked best by the 
new source; the second largest value was given to the country ranked second best and so 
on (Malito, 2014). 
Next step was to apply a beta-transformation to the normalized scores. This increased 
the standard deviation among all countries to the value of the previous year and made it 
possible to differentiate more precisely between countries that appeared to have similar 
scores (Saisana and Saltelli, 2012). In this old methodology TI ranked the countries on a 
scale from 0 to 10. The higher the score is, the cleaner the country’s public sector is 
perceived to be (Karama, 2014 : 18). 
Furthermore, Saisana and Saltelli (2012) point out that the old approach caused 
information loss, because in a given source of information only country ranks are 
considered but not the relative distance between them. In addition, the old methodology 
did not allow comparing CPI scores in a country over time. 
                                                 
1 1) The source must provide a ranking of nations and conduct surveys in a variety of countries with same methodologies. It makes a 
comparison from one country to another possible and thus, a ranking can be produced. 2) The sources must measure the overall extent of 
corruption. The aspects of corruption cannot be mixed with issues other than corruption (e.g. political instability or nationalism). Addi-
tionally, the levels of corruption should be measured, not the changes. Source: Lambsdorff (2007 : 238). 
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Due to the limitations mentioned above Transparency International implemented a 
new methodology for CPI starting from 2012. Nowadays CPI is calculated using a simple 
average of standardized scores, where “all data sources are standardized (by subtracting the 
mean of the data and dividing by the standard deviation) and then rescaled to have a mean 
45 and standard deviation 20”, explain Saisana and Saltelli (2012). The standardization 
formula is presented below: 
 
𝑥𝑖−𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝑥)
𝑠𝑡𝑑(𝑥)
× 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 × 20 + 45  (1) 
The values beyond the bounds [0, 100] are capped after the standardization. To make 
the normalized scores comparable between the available sources, the mean and standard 
deviation need to be defined as global parameters. For this reason CPI uses the statistical 
software package STATA in order to impute scores for countries where data is missing. 
The imputed values are used only during the calculation of the global mean and standard 
deviation but not for the calculation of CPI country scores. In the end, for each source 
across all available countries the mean and standard deviation are calculated and used as 
the parameters to standardize the sources during the normalization (Saisana and Saltelli, 
2012). 
Based on the new CPI methodology, countries are nowadays ranked from zero 
(highly corrupt) to a hundred (very clean), but none of the countries score a perfect one 
hundred. CPI ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to 
exist among public officials and politicians (Rohwer, 2009). Since actual levels of 
corruption cannot be determined directly, perceptions may be the only available 
information (Lambsdorff, 2007 : 20-22). For this reason, various survey questions are 
presented to business people and groups of analysts about the misuse of public power for 
private benefit. 
Overall, CPI has assumed a central place in the researches on the causes and 
consequences of corruption, but it is still limited in scope. CPI does not give full 
information about corruption in a country because it is capturing corruption perceptions 
only in the public sector from business people’s and country experts’ point of view. A 
year-to-year comparisons of CPI can be difficult because a country’s rank can easily 
change due to changes in the list of analyzed countries (Rohwer, 2009). Moreover, the rank 
of a country provided by CPI is hard to transform into a real distance between countries 
which hinders the cross-country analysis from year to year (Malito, 2014). 
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2.3.2. Worldwide Governance Indicators: Control of Corruption (CC) 
The basic approach of Corruption Perception Index was improved by the researchers 
at the World Bank in their Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project (Rohwer, 
2009). The aim of the WGI, in accordance to WB, is to create instruments useful to 
establish more effective instruments of government assistance (Malito, 2014). WGI project 
reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for over 200 countries and 
territories since 1996 for six dimensions of governance
2
 (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Between 
1996 and 2002 the Worldwide Governance Indicators were updated every two years. After 
2002, they are updated on a yearly basis. 
One of the six indicators I am going to use in this thesis as the main corruption 
measure is the Control of Corruption (CC). The World Bank defines CC as the indicator 
that “captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by 
elites and private interests”. 
The information on perceptions for every of the six indicators World Bank 
summarizes from available data sources, such as: surveys of households and firms, 
commercial business information providers, non-governmental and public sector 
organizations. There are small changes from year to year in the set of the sources on which 
the WGI scores are based (Kaufmann et al., 2010). 
The process of constructing the aggregate indicators is the same for each of the six 
indicators. First, the data is collected and rescaled from zero to one, with higher values 
indicating better outcomes. Then it is constructed into a weighted average of the individual 
indicators using a statistical methodology called “unobserved components model (UCM)”. 
Rohwer (2009) remarks that this type of model is used because corruption is unobservable, 
so it can be only approximated by aggregating the scores from given indicators. 
In comparison to the matching percentiles technique used in CPI, UCM has the 
advantage of maintaining some of the important information in the underlying data that 
enables to observe the size of the gaps between countries (Kaufmann et al., 2010). In 
addition to that, UCM methodology appropriately formalizes the issue of aggregation as a 
signal extraction problem. Kaufmann et al. (2010) in their working paper give an example 
of this UCM advantage. They demonstrate that all individual indicators of corruption are 
                                                 
2
 1) Voice and Accountability; 2) Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism; 3) Government Effectiveness; 4) Regulatory 
Quality; 5) Rule of Law; 6) Control of Corruption. 
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2010). 
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imperfect proxies. When these indicators are aggregated they can result in a more 
informative signal. In spite of that, these imperfect aggregate measures can be successfully 
summarized by the standard errors and confidence intervals generated by the UCM 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010). 
Based on the official WGI measures, Malito (2014) provides an example of the 
compound of corruption. A linear function of unobserved corruption (or any of other 
indicator from WGI) can be presented as follows: 
 𝑦𝑗𝑘 = 𝛼𝑘 + 𝛽𝑘(𝑔𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗𝑘), (2) 
where 𝑦 is the observed outcome of the index (𝑘 defines one of the six indicators of 
government) in a country 𝑗, which depends on the value of the unobserved corruption (or 
governance) 𝑔 and a disturbance term 𝜀. The data from various sources may have different 
measurement scales, so 𝛼 and 𝛽 parameters rescale the data from each source into single 
units (Kaufmann et al., 2010). 
Moreover, Kaufmann et al. (2010) state that the estimation of corruption allows for 
unavoidable uncertainty. For correct interpretation of corruption it is important to pay 
attention to the standard errors as they reflect the number of sources available for a country 
(the more sources the smaller standard errors) and capture the inherent uncertainty in 
measuring corruption.  
It is important to mention that the statistical methodology of UCM generates margins 
of error for each governance estimate. Kaufmann et al. (2010) describe that the margins of 
error are computed because corruption (as a part of governance) is difficult to measure 
using any kind of data. Under these circumstances the margins of error reported by WGI 
must be taken into account when making comparisons across countries and over time 
(Malito, 2014). 
The World Bank reports the six aggregate indicators in two ways (higher values 
corresponding to better outcomes): 
a) In standard normal units, ranging from -2.5 to 2.5; 
b) In percentile rank, from 0 to 100. 
In comparison to CPI, CC measures corruption in both public and private sectors 
with much broader data source. The authors of both indices are motivated to reduce 
measurement errors by using data from various sources. However, Rohwer (2009) 
criticizes that the large number of countries covered by WGI has reduced the validity of 
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the indicator because WB includes also “problematic” data sources. 
Furthermore, both perception-based indicators CPI and CC are not completely 
reliable and they have been often criticized which may affect the estimation in this thesis. 
The main critics are listed below (Lambsdorff, 2007; Rohwer, 2009; Malito, 2014): 
a) It is unclear what exactly CPI and CC are measuring as the sources of corruption are 
averaged together. 
b) Due to the fact that the sources used in constructing these indices change over time, 
naturally, the definitions of both indices change also. 
c) The perception indices do not take into consideration the experience of poor and 
disenfranchised people. As well as the fact that most people are biased towards either 
a government or its opposition is ignored. 
CPI and CC indices are advised to be used rather as complementary information. The 
scales of the aggregate estimates cannot be reliable for monitoring the changes in levels of 
governance over time, but they rather illustrate the changes in the relative positions of 
individual countries (Rohwer, 2009). Nevertheless, the aggregate sources are more 
informative compared to using only one source. The aggregation of independent sources 
can increase the reliability of the measures of corruption (Malito, 2014).  
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3. Hypothesized assumptions of corruption drivers and business 
influencing factors based on the evidence from Ukraine and 
observations in the econometric studies 
The main idea of this chapter is to set the hypotheses for the econometric part of this 
thesis. First of all, I observe the causes of corruption as they are the reason why corruption 
exists. Next, I discuss how corruption affects business activity and what other factors may 
impact private sector development. 
3.1. Causes of corruption 
According to Transparency International corruption is a problem all over the globe 
and it is threatening economic growth for both developed and developing countries. In 
general, economic literature observes several groups of factors that influence corruption 
directly: political, legal, historical, social, cultural and economic (Andrei et al., 2009). 
Various studies have extensively analyzed all the possible drivers of corruption (Rose-
Ackerman, 1999; Ades and Di Tella, 1997 and 1999; Lambsdorff, 1999; Tanzi, 1998; 
Treisman, 2000; Gurgur and Shah, 2005; Billger and Goel, 2009). However, in this chapter 
I take into consideration the causes of corruption observed in Ukraine and compare them to 
the results from economic literature. The outcome of the comparison is presented in a form 
of a hypothesis in the end of every sub-chapter. 
A survey conducted by Kyiv International Institute for Sociology in 2011 emphasizes 
that in Ukraine on average 25.8% of respondents faced with a bribery-extortion in the 
preceding year. Furthermore, 47.1% of respondents complained that officials demanded 
payments explicitly when dealing with government permits, and 40.2% testified bribe 
extortion in business regulation and inspection. Moreover, 36.1% reported bribing when 
dealing with customs and 30.2% - with judiciary (Fedirko, 2013). As a result, corruption in 
Ukraine is well spread. 
3.1.1.  Judicial system 
Ukrainian entrepreneurs claim that they cannot trust Ukrainian judiciary because 
judgment of court is usually done in the favor of public officials. This makes it impossible 
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for any company to prove its right in court even if the company’s actions have been 
consistent with the legislation (Savitskii, 2012). Moreover, high dependency of Ukrainian 
judicial system on politicians leads to insecurity in business decision making. In addition, 
The Business Anti-Corruption Portal determines other judicial drawbacks in Ukraine: 
contracts are not well enforced, the risk of expropriation is high and enforcement of 
arbitration decisions is poor. Furthermore, vague laws and regulations provide officials 
with opportunities for rent-seeking (The Business Anti-Corruption Portal). 
Existing empirical studies show twofold results concerning judicial systems. Ades 
and Di Tella (1997, 1999) found out that judicial autonomy may result in higher 
corruption. However, Lambsdorff (1999) states that the independence of the judiciary are 
important factors that may reduce corruption. Additionally, weaker measure of law and 
order leads to a more corrupt society (Brown and Shackmana, 2007 : 231). 
Based on the studies mentioned above I will rather hypothesize that: 
H1. The more independent judicial system is, the lower corruption level there is in a 
country. 
3.1.2.  Salaries and GDP 
Corruption in Ukraine spreads easily also due to low salaries of the public officials in 
local administrative bodies such as traffic police, health system, tax administration and 
education system (Investment Climate Statement, 2013). As stated in the paper of 
Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova Peter (2007), wages of Ukrainian public sector employees 
are 24-32% lower than of the counterparts in private sector. Their results also show that the 
wage gap is particularly large at the top of the wage distribution and increases with worker 
productivity; therefore unofficial compensation in a form of bribes is common in public 
sector. However, as reported in the article of Stelmakh (2012), high salaries of public 
officials do not guarantee total elimination of corruption, but at least it lowers the bribe 
taking motivation. 
There is also another point to be considered. Apart from low salaries of public 
officials, the total wealth of top Ukrainian oligarchs reaches 85% of Ukrainian GDP 
(Kuzio, 2008; Holoyda, 2013). These businessmen took control over major state industries 
in the 90’s after Ukraine’s independence. It was the time when Soviet corrupt connections 
collapsed and new ones appeared. Concentration of the country’s wealth among oligarchs 
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could be one of the reasons why Ukraine’s GDP is so low. 
If the biggest share of GDP reflects the wealth of the richest citizens then it may not 
be the best measure of country’s performance. However, GDP is the most common 
measure for comparing one country to another (Investopedia). Many scholars tried to 
analyze the relationship between growth in real GDP per capita and cross-national 
measures of perceived corruption (Aidt, 2009). Several researches (Mauro, 1995; Mo, 
2001) found the evidence that corruption reduces growth of GDP per capita. In particular, 
Mauro (1995) finds that one-standard-deviation improvement in the corruption index is 
associated with a 1.3% point increase in the annual growth rate of GDP per capita. In 
comparison, results of Mo (2001) suggest that 1% increase in corruption level reduces the 
growth rate by about 0.72%. 
This point is also sustained by the work of Mustapha (2014) who tests the hypothesis 
about negative impact of corruption on GDP per capita. Based on the tests and data from 
20 countries, strong statistically significant negative impact of corruption on the GDP per 
capita was indeed found. The results of Mustapha (2014) show that a country’s 10 points 
increase in the corruption index will lead to a decrease of USD2849 in GDP per capita. 
Another essential point is discussed by Bai et al. (2014). Their paper examines the 
relationship between higher growth and lower corruption, using firm level data from 
Vietnam for a five-year-period. Their empirical estimations show two results: 
1) Economic growth reduces the amounts of bribes paid to government officials; 
2) The reduction in corruption caused by economic growth is larger for firms with 
higher ability to relocate. 
Furthermore, it is also reasonable to look at the study of Aidt (2010). He defines that 
recent researches rarely find robust evidence that corruption has a sizable negative effect 
on growth in real GDP per capita. In his earlier paper Aidt (2009) did not find any negative 
effect of corruption on economic growth as the correlation between these variables is close 
to zero. In spite of it, Aidt (2009) notifies that corruption is a “significant hindrance for 
sustainable development”. 
As the data on salaries of public officials is not available for a number of countries, 
my analysis will rather use the data on GDP per capita. Taking into consideration that the 
relationship between corruption and GDP per capita is unclear as the causality can run in 
both ways, I expect however that: 
H2. Higher level of GDP per capita is associated with lower corruption. 
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3.1.3. Centralized governance 
Another key point that drives corruption in Ukraine is centralized governance which 
limits a decision-making process in local governments. The government located in the 
capital is not able to solve a number of local issues and thus, due to disturbances 
concerning regional problems, does not work efficiently on a national level (Moldovan, 
2014). A vast amount of fiscal revenues collected locally is transferred to the central 
budget, consequently local governments are completely dependent on funding allocated by 
the Ukrainian national parliament (European Committee of the Regions, 2011 : 15). 
Centralized financial flows provide a lot of power to the decision makers who are usually 
involved in corruption schemes. As a result, there is no funding left to stimulate local 
development, and hence governors are rather irrelevant to local development which harms 
the country in general (European Committee of the Regions, 2011 : 15; Moldovan, 2014). 
It is important to note that in order to deal with this problem current Ukrainian 
president Poroshenko is focused on decentralization. Ukrainian decentralization is intended 
to eliminate a number of departments, allocate resources at local levels and reduce tiers of 
the administrative and territorial structures (Reform of Decentralization of Power in 
Ukraine). 
In line with economic literature on decentralization, Treisman (2000 b) states that the 
more tiers there are, the more decentralized the system is. In addition, perceived corruption 
is higher in countries with a larger number of tiers in governments where reported bribery 
is more frequent (Fan et al. 2008). 
Moreover, another paper of Treisman (1998) points out that federal states are 
perceived to be more corrupt because the division of power in federal structure leads to a 
greater burden of venality for firms doing business. However, Ali and Isse (2003) found 
that federalism with a decentralized government reduces corruption. In contrast, 
Teobaldelli (2011) determines that federalism is rather a process of governmental 
decentralization with stronger subnational governments. 
An equally significant aspect is suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1993) who note 
that both very centralized and decentralized states may suffer less from corruption 
compared to states with an intermediate level of institutional centralization. 
Correspondingly, weakness of a central government leads to higher corruption (Vishny and 
Schleifer, 1993). Fjeldstad (2004) additionally advocates that some researchers argue about 
decentralized political systems being more corrupt, because it is harder to monitor corrupt 
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activities. Nevertheless, Gurgur and Shah (2005) hold the position that centralized decision 
making is correlated with higher corruption. 
Moreover, in accordance with Ahlin (2001), bureaucratic decentralization is more 
resistant to reduce corruption, whereas corruption decreases in the case of regional 
decentralization. The author adds that decentralization creates competition between regions 
resulting in higher efficiency in governance. For instance, when businesses can move 
freely between regions or localities, corruption is expected to be lower (Treisman, 1998). 
Indeed, Bai et al. (2014) explain that it is especially beneficial for larger firms to move to 
areas with lower bribe rates. This causes competition among country’s areas in order to 
attract more firms, and thus corruption level usually drops. 
H3. Corruption level is lower in a decentralized (non-federal) state compared to a 
centralized (federal) state. 
3.1.4. Competition among local governments 
Decentralization of political power is also a way to eliminate corruption and to 
promote better development. The control over Ukraine as a whole has always been 
centralized among some politicians and their relatives. The history of Ukrainian political 
competition has never been clear. According to Way (2005 : 193-194) some politicians 
were using physical force against political opponents, others used “extra-legal and anti-
democratic means” to keep staying in power when their positions were weakening. 
Moreover, several cases of media censorship took place in the past. Furthermore, recent 
monopolized political control has closely moved Ukraine to an autocratic regime 
(Shevchenko, 2014). 
In the line with Teobaldelli (2011), economic literature notes that decentralization 
indeed has a positive impact also on competition among local governments. He explains 
that competition induces politicians to adopt more socially optimal fiscal policies in 
comparison to those implemented in a centralized economy. Furthermore, Vishny and 
Schleifer (1993) remark that in countries with more political competition, public pressure 
against corruption is stronger. That is to say, political competition between the ruling 
parties opposition keeps corruption down. 
H4. More competition among politicians leads to lower corruption levels. 
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3.1.5. Taxation system 
Another driver of corruption in Ukraine is taxation system which is one of the most 
complicated in the world, point out Burlaka and Sologoub (2014). First of all, the norms of 
Tax Code are too general and are not well clarified that makes it a source of unofficial 
benefits for tax inspectors. Next, very often tax inspectors receive a “plan” from higher-
level tax authorities with an amount of additional taxes and fines to be collected to the 
central budget. Furthermore, due to high social contributions a vast amount of real salaries 
are paid in cash lowering budget revenues (Burlaka and Sologoub, 2014). 
According to various economic studies, the more complex tax system is, the more 
excessive discretion tax officials get, and thus it leads to higher institutional corruption. In 
this case the taxpayer evades taxes and preferably chooses to bribe the auditor (Imam and 
Jacobs, 2007; Purohit, 2007). However, Chetwynd et al. (2003) describe a survey where 
respondents from several middle income level countries indicate that they are willing to 
pay more taxes if corruption could be controlled. As a result, corruption can create 
distortions leading to excessive tax rates (Attila, 2008). 
A number of studies evaluate the relationship between corruption and total tax rate as 
inverse. Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) empirically analyze a link between these two variables 
and find that corruption has a larger impact on direct taxes in developing countries 
compared to developed ones which can be explained by the prevalence of tax evasion. 
Their results show that 4 points reduction in corruption can increase direct taxes in 
developing countries, as a group, by 7.2% of GDP. 
Moreover, according to Tanzi (2000 : 142) if there is corruption in tax 
administration, the tax burden for a taxpayer will be higher because of included bribe. In 
this case the official burden measured by government is much lower without the bribe 
share. Consequently, corruption explains why taxpayers may complain about heavy taxes 
in countries where amounts of government tax revenue differ considerably from real tax 
burdens. 
Evidence in support of this position, can be found in a paper of Ivanyna et al. (2010). 
They remark that corruption makes tax rates go up because corrupt officials gain a part of 
government revenue for private use. According to the paper, the presence of corruption and 
tax evasion increases the tax rate by more than 50%.  
H5. More complex tax system leads to higher corruption level. 
22 
 
In short, all the hypotheses between corruption and its drivers starting from H1 to H5 
are summarized in the Figure 1. The sign in the parenthesis reflects whether a relationship 
is negative (-) or positive (+). For instance, independent judicial system negatively affects 
the level of corruption (H1) or complex tax system increases corruption level (H5). 
Moreover, an additional arrow between corruption level and GDP per capita shows that the 
causality can run in both directions – higher GDP per capita may lower corruption as well 
as higher corruption may reduce GDP growth (OECD, 2015 : 123). 
 
 
Figure 1. Summary of the hypotheses from H1 to H5 
  (Source: Compiled by author) 
3.2. Relationship between business and corruption 
Business is the main driver of economic efficiency and innovation. Business 
prosperity usually leads to growth in the output of economy, and consequently creates new 
jobs and improves country's standard of living. With favorable business environment 
countries get more productive and competitive economies. Otherwise, in the case of hostile 
business conditions, entrepreneurship is less attractive due to reduced overall rewards. 
Moreover, hostile business environment creates barriers to entry and benefits only the 
firms that are already in existence. These firms become extremely profitable because 
“partially reformed economy offers entrepreneurs lucrative unfilled niches” (Johnson et al., 
2002). 
Legal SMB contribute only about 5% to Ukraine’s GDP making the government 
irrelevant to such a small fraction of the benefit. However, non-official estimates account 
for about 30% of population employed in SMB (Polishuk and Tsimbal, 2011). For many 
years Ukrainian government considered entrepreneurs as entities who do not pay taxes or 
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other fees to social security funds, and thus lots of regulations were not in favor of SMB. 
Apart from the severe conditions created by the government, Ukrainian entrepreneurs 
are additionally affected by corruption prevalent in tax administration, traffic police, 
customs, judicial system and land administration. The biggest amount of corruption is 
observed in public procurement. A research of Institute of Applied Humanitarian Research 
(2012 b : 23) indicates that about 72% of Ukrainian SMB respondents spend annually 10-
30% of their budgets for paying bribes or other types of unofficial fees. 
In Ukrainian business cash-bribes and personal ties in state departments are common. 
They are used not only in order to avoid a number of burdensome government regulations, 
but also when one wants to obtain undeserved benefits. Basically, in a long run corruption 
diminishes competitiveness of businesses, giving some firms a lot of illegal advantages and 
forcing others out of the market. Consequently, the companies that follow the rules and 
obey the laws are not able to survive (Institute of Applied Humanitarian Research, 2012 a; 
2012b). 
In accordance with economic literature, one of the major obstacles for doing business 
is corruption as it raises costs of business activity and tends to drive legitimate 
entrepreneurship underground (Mueller, 2003 : 544). Additionally, as has been noted by 
World Bank, evidence from private sector assessments suggests that corruption in the form 
of bribing can prevent firms from growing. 
Historical evidence provided by Baumol (1990) proves that in corrupt environments 
entrepreneurs will put more effort to non-innovative rent-seeking activities, like lobbying 
and bribing public officers, rather than improving productive capacity. Moreover, corrupt 
conditions will simply result in lower total outputs and wages (Ahlin, 2001). 
An interesting point presents the working paper of Djankov et al. (2000) who analyze 
a relationship between corruption and regulations of entry of start-up firms. Their 
arguments emphasize that heavier regulations are correlated with higher corruption. 
Furthermore, less democratic governments tend to regulate entry more heavily and the 
main beneficiaries in this case are obviously politicians and bureaucrats. Moreover, start-
ups are more affected by corruption compared to established businesses. As a result, this is 
likely to reduce the number of people opting for the business career path or who are eager 
to implement a business idea (OECD, 2013). 
Moreover, it is also important to describe the way how corruption can directly affect 
efficiency of firms. Considering the countries in Latin America, Dal Bó and Rossi (2007) 
define that extra input of labor causes inefficiency if capital input and produced output do 
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not change. The results suggest that in less corrupt countries firms produce the same 
outputs with fewer employees compared to more corrupt countries. That is to say, 
excessive employees in countries with higher corruption are involved in not very 
productive work which hurts economies of their countries. 
Moreover, the study conducted by Tonoyan et al. (2010) explains why entrepreneurs 
and small business owners become involved in corrupt deals in form of bribe-payers. They 
point out that the likelihood of engaging in corruption depends on country-specific formal 
and informal institutional make-up, low efficiency of financial and legal institutions and 
the lack of their enforcements. Authors emphasize that these reasons can explain 
significantly higher corruption levels in transition economies compared to those in mature 
market economies. Likewise, a study of Ahlin (2001) indicates that according to 
businessmen’s opinion corruption is a serious obstacle especially in developing and 
transition economies. 
Corruption and business is studied also by Avnimelech and Zelekha (2011) who use 
a dataset on entrepreneurship collected from LinkedIn. They find strong supportive 
evidence that corruption has a significant negative impact on “productive” 
entrepreneurship and thus on economic growth. 
Based on the studies mentioned above, I set my next hypothesis: 
H6. Corruption negatively affects business. 
3.3. Other factors that have impact on business 
This part of the thesis is focused on the other factors apart from corruption that have 
an impact on business life. Similarly to the chapter 3.1., in this part the components 
defining business activity are also taken from the example of Ukraine. As previously, the 
impact of these factors is compared to the results obtained from various economic studies. 
As country’s development is closely related to business climate, which unfortunately 
remains adverse in Ukraine, the country’s performance leaves a lot to be desired. 
Nevertheless, analysis of a number of international sources shows that Ukraine has got a 
big potential for development after it achieved its independence. For instance, by the area 
Ukraine is the biggest country in Europe with a number of natural resources, very fertile 
soils and access to the Black Sea. Advantageous geographical location between European 
Union and Russia gives an easy access to foreign trade. In addition, Ukraine’s population 
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of about 45 Million people provides a big number of consumers in the domestic market. 
Moreover, solid educational system in Ukraine offers access to all levels of education 
resulting in a relatively high level of human development. And finally, a well-developed 
transport infrastructure makes Ukraine accessible by land, water and air (PWC, 2013b; The 
Global Competitiveness Report 2013–2014; World Bank, 2014). 
Obviously, all those factors may favor SMB growth. For this reason in the following 
subchapters I focus on the empirical evidence in order to check whether all of them are 
indeed favorable for business also in other countries. 
3.3.1. Compulsory education 
A meta-analysis of van der Sluis et al. (2005) compares several empirical studies of 
the impact of schooling in entrepreneurship selection and performance. According to their 
results, there is a lack of relationship between years of schooling and probability of 
choosing entrepreneurial activity in industrial countries. They add that the effect of 
education on entrepreneurship is disappointing because many unobserved factors are not 
taken into account. 
Education is also observed in the study of Kolstad et al. (2014) who check the 
relationship between schooling years and entrepreneurship in Bangladesh. They take into 
account the endogeneity of education and use education of father as the main instrument in 
the study. Kolstad et al. (2014 : 56-57) believe that education can improve profits of firms 
and they find that an added year of education indeed increases entrepreneurial profits by 
11.1%. This result is similar to the meta-analysis of van der Sluis et al. (2005) who find 
that an added year of schooling in developing economies increases profits by an average of 
5.5%. Furthermore, Kolstad et al. (2014) test whether education makes entrepreneurs 
successful in pursuing larger markets and whether education increases innovation 
activities. However, the results they get are rather insignificant. 
The results provided in various reports about business in Ukraine (PWC, 2013; The 
Global Competitiveness Report 2013–2014; World Bank, 2014) and econometric studies 
differ in their conclusions. However, as education definitely does not have any negative 
impact on business, there is no reason not to believe that: 
H7. Increase in years of education could foster business intentions. 
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3.3.2. Tertiary graduates 
Human capital in a relationship with new firm concentration is observed in the study 
of Armington and Acs (2002). Their findings show that a share of college graduates is 
positively correlated with new firm concentration in US regions. Consequently, the regions 
with higher amount of college graduates tend to have higher start-ups rates. However, 
these results do not concern firms involved in business services or manufacturing 
(Armington and Acs, 2002). Evidence in support of the previously mentioned results can 
be found in the work of Lee et al. (2004), though in contrast, they find a positive impact of 
post-secondary education also in services. 
The article of Wu and Wu (2008) investigates the relationship between Chinese 
people with higher educational background and their entrepreneurial intentions. The 
authors affirm that entrepreneurial intentions are rather explained by personal behavior and 
attitude than educational background. At the same time entrepreneurship seems less 
attractive to postgraduate students compared to those with undergraduate degree. 
Moreover, entrepreneurial intention is affected by academic major. Wu and Wu (2008) 
find that students majoring in Engineering are more willing to start business than others. 
The findings of Guerrero et al. (2008) from Catalonia also show that the probability 
to start business is higher when the students are from engineering courses. However, the 
descriptive analysis in the study presents that students with entrepreneurship related majors 
represent the biggest share among all majors who desire to create a new firm. Despite this, 
when Guerrero et al. (2008) test the model including all types of students, results are not 
significant. For this reason, the model was divided into sub samples and provided 
consistent results. 
In addition to previously mentioned results, it is also reasonable to look at the 
research of Turker and Selcuk (2009). They demonstrate that entrepreneurial career 
depends on the educational quality of universities. If a university provides sufficient 
business knowledge and encouragement, the possibility of choosing an entrepreneurial 
career might increase. 
Based on the studies above, the impact of university degree on business activity is 
positive or insignificant. For this reason the following hypothesis is similar to the previous 
one, so: 
H8. Tertiary education could foster business activity. 
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3.3.3. Population 
After having considered the impact of education on business, the next step is to 
demonstrate how the size of domestic market (represented by country’s population) 
influences business. The most common indicators used in economic literature are 
population growth and population density. 
The findings of Wennekers et al. (2005) establish that population growth has positive 
effect of on entrepreneurship. They explain that growing population requires bigger 
consumer markets which creates new economic activities. This point is also sustained by 
the work of Armington and Acs (2002 : 43), where population growth is strongly and 
positively correlated with firm birth rates for all industries in USA. 
In contrast, population density is used in the article of Fritsch and Mueller (2007) 
who investigate the factors determining the level of regional business formation-activity in 
West Germany. Fritsch and Mueller (2007) find a negative impact of population density on 
start-ups in the pooled OLS regression and explain it in a way that agglomerated areas 
provide relatively unfavorable conditions for start-ups. Further, they compare OLS results 
to the fixed-effects model and conclude that the population density is non-significant in the 
latter one, meaning that its importance in business formation-activity is minor. 
Similar results are obtained by Di Addario and Vuri (2010) who analyze market size 
and young college graduates as entrepreneurs in Italy. The authors show that densest 
markets do not encourage young college graduates to start entrepreneurial activities. They 
explain that these markets have larger public sectors that can provide a number of job 
opportunities. As a result, “doubling the province of work's population density reduces the 
chances of being an entrepreneur by 2–3 percentage points”, state Di Addario and Vuri 
(2010). 
On the contrary, a study from Japan finds that higher population density leads to a 
higher incentive for individuals to become entrepreneurs. It is stated that, if population 
density rises by 10%, the share of people willing to start a venture increases by 1% (Sato et 
al., 2012). 
The arguments shown above help to hypothesize that: 
H9. More population has rather negative impact on business activity. 
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3.3.4. Foreign trade 
As was stated previously Ukraine has good access to foreign markets, in this case the 
amount of trade might be a good measure to check whether the statement applies to other 
countries as well. 
The Global Poverty Report (2001) emphasizes that trade openness creates new and 
better paid jobs, improves productivity, lowers a cost of capital, accordingly, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows increase, which facilitates establishing new businesses. With 
growing trade already existing firms gain access to needed inputs and larger markets 
(OECD, 2012). However, the amount of trade is closely correlated with trade 
liberalization
3
. Hence, improper business climate can block the benefits of trade 
opportunities. 
An interesting point of view has a report of De Clercq et al. (2006) that presents 
arguments to emphasize the idea of knowledge spillovers in the creation of economic 
growth. The researchers test data from 34 countries over a four-year period and find that a 
country’s outward FDI, export and import positively influence entrepreneurs’ export 
orientation. De Clercq et al. (2006) present also an empirical evidence for the spillover 
effect from export-oriented entrepreneurship to a country’s overall level of entrepreneurial 
activity. The report has a valuable statement that an increased level of international trade 
(both export and import), in combination with outward FDI, may stimulate entrepreneurs’ 
involvement in export activities, and this may ultimately foster a country’s economic 
prosperity. 
Other papers (Martens, 2008 and Yanikkaya, 2002) also emphasize that trade is a 
complement to FDI. The researches show that these two variables have bi-directional 
causality, in other words, FDI is explained by trade openness in some countries and in 
others is just the opposite. It is hard to define the exact impact of trade openness on 
business conditions, but the clear fact is that country’s amount of export and import is a 
result of national trade regulations and reforms. 
An interesting point is observed from the study of Yanikkaya (2002) who conducts 
an empirical investigation in order to find how a foreign trade with highly innovative 
countries can influence their trading partners. The findings suggest that countries that have 
more trade with a developed and technologically innovative country are likely to grow 
                                                 
3
 Removal or reduction of obstacles on free exchange of goods between nations. This includes tariff (duties and surcharges) and non-
tariff obstacles (like licensing rules, quotas and other requirements). Source: Investopedia. 
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faster compared to countries that have less trade with a developed country. 
As a result, in my next hypothesis is as follows: 
H10. Foreign trade might favor business formation. 
Having observed the positive factors, there is also, a further point to be considered. 
According to Ukrainian entrepreneurs there are a number of economical, legislative and 
political obstacles that disturb the development of SMBs. The most influential ones are: 
lack of financial aid, complex tax system and insecurity of property rights (Institute of 
Applied Humanitarian Research, 2012; European Investment Bank, 2013; Petrovska and 
Nedilko, 2014). The magnitude of their impacts is discussed in the subchapters below. 
3.3.5. Financial aid 
External finances is an important factor in business development especially at the 
start-ups, as most of the beginning entrepreneurs do not own enough funds for conducting 
business activity. The problem in Ukraine rises on one hand, due to a lack of financial 
support from the government. On the other hand, financial institutions like banks require 
collateral and offer mostly short-term loans with lending rates up to 20% (Polishuk and 
Tsimbal, 2011). It follows that, Ukrainian firms get less bank loans than firms of Western 
neighbors. Furthermore, an alternative source of credit received from other firms remains 
too low in Ukraine, whereas in neighboring Poland and Slovakia it is one of the most 
important sources of external finances in business (Johnson et al., 2002). As a result, a lot 
of arising business ideas can never be fulfilled in Ukraine. 
Concerning economic studies, Kuzilwa (2005) focuses on businesses that received 
credits from the government in Tanzania. It has been shown in his study that access to 
credit is associated with increases in businesses’ output. Additionally, limited accesses to 
credit, as well as inadequate credit amount tend to hinder the development of business. 
Moreover, Kuzilwa’s (2005) findings indicate that the credit is mostly used for business 
expansion not for start-ups. Accordingly, demand of credit increases simultaneously with 
the size of business. 
By the same token, Ginevičius et al. (2008) analyze the effect of financial aid in a 
form of government subsidies on business in Lithuania. They find that not the absolute 
amount of aid but the aid intensity has greater positive effect on business. Consequently, 
higher aid intensity results in greater effect. Besides, the authors conclude that the aid gives 
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the best results in business activities involved in production, R&D and education. 
Obviously, financial aid in the form of bank credit has the same effect. Johnson et al. 
(2002) state that if needed bank credit is not available, entrepreneurs cannot take advantage 
of new growth opportunities.  
The evidence from the economic literature suggests that: 
H11.More financial aid in business is correlated with better business prosperity. 
3.3.6. Taxes 
Complicated tax system in Ukraine drives corruption and directly affects private 
sector. As an example, the Tax Code that came into effect in 2011 “expanded the powers 
of the internal revenue service and reduced the rights of taxpayers by adding a lot more red 
tape”, states Volkov (2011). As a result, the entrepreneurs are now paying much higher 
taxes and spending more time doing paper work than before. Burlaka and Sologoub (2014) 
additionally advocate that it is costly and time consuming for enterprises to provide all the 
reports with supplements. Moreover, every mistake in a report is fined. As can be 
expected, due to corruption and personal connections some companies consistently avoid 
paying taxes, and for others tax controls become repressive. Constantly increasing tax 
burden, unplanned tax inspections, unofficial tax payments and extremely high fines make 
it very difficult to conduct business in Ukraine (Petrovska and Nedilko, 2014). 
The results of the surveys showed by Ahlin (2001 : 2) note that tax regulations is 
indeed a serious obstacle in doing business. Taxes have strong impact on business 
conditions by influencing incentives and behavior of economic actors. A financial 
journalist Fontinelle demonstrates how high corporate tax rate in USA has a negative 
impact on domestic corporations. In her article Fontinelle provides several facts: 
a) High corporate tax is a competitive disadvantage when a company tries to attract new 
corporate investment and jobs. As a result, domestic corporations relocate to foreign 
countries with lower tax rates. 
b) Due to high tax burden companies start lobbying politicians in order to change tax 
regulations. Consequently, companies spend less on developing issues. 
c) Even the amount of total tax to be paid is already an obstacle for business owners. 
Tax itself lowers the amount of possible future investment or saving for sustaining 
the business through hard times. 
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Likewise, a negative correlation is observed also by PwC Senior Economic Adviser, 
Sentence (2013). His team conducts a regression analysis to look at the relationship 
between the Paying Taxes indicators and the average economic growth rate across 166 
countries over eight-year period. Their results indicate that economies with lower tax rates 
on business and less complex tax systems experience stronger growth and attract more 
foreign direct investment. In addition, Sentence (2013) remarks that each 10% point cut in 
the total tax rate is associated with an increase in the annual economic growth rate by just 
under 0.1%. Since the impact on overall economic growth is slightly dependent on initial 
tax rate, other components like number of tax payments or administrative complexity of 
tax system cause much more influence. According to Sentence (2013), changes in the tax 
system may well be correlated with other policy developments which improve the business 
climate in an economy and hence raise growth (PwC, 2013a). 
Another example is introduced in a publication of UK government in 2013. In April 
2011 Corporation Tax was reduced from 28 per cent to 26 per cent. At that period of time 
the economy of UK was affected by external shocks which created uncertainty for business 
and hence business investment fell by 30 per cent. However, according to the publication 
till the end of 2013 business confidence has improved. As a result, growth across all 
industrial sectors of the economy contributed into the growth of GDP. As business 
confidence grows, business investment is expected to grow strongly. The modelling work 
in the publication suggests that a long term effect from Corporation Tax reduction might 
cause a strong positive impact on business investment and thus increase in GDP. 
H12.More complex tax systems worsen business conditions. 
3.3.7. Property rights 
Another negative aspect in Ukrainian business development is insecure property 
rights. Property rights describe a legal right to own a property protected by clear laws of 
the state (The Heritage Foundation). In Ukraine imperfect system of registration, 
drawbacks in property laws and weak legal protection cause uncertainty in state’s 
capability to ensure stable property rights (Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, 2009-
2010). As reported by a number of Ukrainian businessmen, it is quite risky to invest in 
business activities because the likelihood that private property will be expropriated is high 
(Duhliy, 2015). 
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Especially insecure property rights are in the construction industry which becomes an 
obstacle for business development. Moreover, about 5-10% of property in Ukraine has got 
formal legal registration, whereas the rest of it is considered to be “sub-property”. Close 
ties of politics and business allow influential businessmen to control their own “sub-
property” and seize for competitors’ one (Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, 2009-
2010). 
A theoretical research of Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) indicates that a marginal 
improvement in enforcement of property rights is estimated to increase the expected return 
to entrepreneurship. They underline that higher returns in entrepreneurship activity attract 
more agents to become entrepreneurs rather than public servants. 
Similarly, a working paper of Johnson et al. (2002) establishes that firm’s growth 
depends a lot on secure property rights. The authors explain that effective protection of 
property rights is positively correlated with the use of external finances. Countries with 
secure property rights offer better protection for foreign investors and thus, receive more 
financial inflows. Moreover, with secure property rights the entrepreneurs feel confident to 
reinvest their profits and receive additional benefits. 
Taking into account the results provided above, my final hypothesis is: 
H13. Secure property rights facilitate private-sector development. 
To visually summarize the hypotheses concerning the factors influencing business, 
Figure 2 illustrates the relationships from H6 to H13. Likewise in the Figure 1, the sign in 
the parenthesis reflects positive (+) or negative (-) correlation. 
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Figure 2. Summary of the hypotheses from H6 to H13 
(Source: Compiled by author) 
  
Business 
formation 
H6. 
Corruption  
(-) 
H7. Years of 
education (+) 
H8. Tertiary 
education (+) 
H9. More 
population 
(-) 
H10. 
Foreign 
trade (+) 
H11. 
Financial 
aid (+) 
H12. 
Complex tax 
system (-) 
H13. Secure 
property 
rights (+)   
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4. Econometric research on corruption and business formation 
After the problematic drivers of corruption and business formation are defined and 
discussed, the aim of this chapter is to present the regression models based on the 
hypotheses. Data and the methodology used for estimation in this thesis are presented in 
this chapter as well. 
4.1. The models of corruption and business formation and their data sources 
4.1.1. Corruption model 
The corruption model observes the drivers of corruption and is based on the 
hypotheses from H1 to H5. A review of the economic studies suggests that causes of 
corruption have legal, political and economic roots (Brown and Shackman, 2007). 
Following the example of Brown and Shackman (2007 : 322-323) the baseline form of the 
corruption model is as follows (3): 
 𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡, (3) 
where C is corruption level; 
 RL is Rule of Law indicator that denotes the judicial autonomy and thus the legal 
root; 
DF is Dummy Federal or the measure for decentralization which reflects the 
political root; 
 GDP is GDP per capita, reflects the economic root; 
 i is a country in the dataset; 
 t is time period (year). 
 
The main measure of corruption in my thesis is Control of Corruption index as it is 
more comparable over the years in comparison to Corruption Perception Index. 
Nevertheless, CPI will be used for the robustness checks. Another reason to employ these 
indices is that the data on CC and CPI can be obtained free of charge. Both of these indices 
are discussed in the chapters 2.3.1. and 2.3.2.. 
Likewise Control of Corruption, Rule of Law is another WB’s indicator of WGI 
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group but it reflects the legal root in the corruption equation (3). RL measures perceptions 
of agents about functioning and independence of the judiciary, in particular, the degree of 
judicial independence from state, fairness and speediness of judicial process, trust in 
judiciary and judicial accountability. The indicator provides percentile ranks to countries 
where 0 determines the lowest rank and 100 consequently the highest. The Rule of Law 
indicator is rather an aggregate measure which will be used also later on for defining the 
business activity in the business model. 
The next variable is Dummy Federal which I composed using the information of an 
international governance organization called The Forum of Federations. The web page of 
this organization provides information on federalism by countries and accounts for roughly 
25 federal states. Thereby, dummy variable takes a value of one if a country is federal and 
zero otherwise. This approach is similar to the study of Teobaldelli (2011) where 
federalism is proxied by a dummy variable reflecting whether or not a country has a 
federalist constitution. 
The measure of GDP per capita is taken from the World Bank database. The values 
are shown in current USD and calculated by dividing gross domestic product of each 
country by their midyear populations. A rise in GDP per capita displays growth in the 
economy which implies higher standards of living. In this thesis I use natural logarithm of 
GDP per capita to simplify the interpretation of the coefficients. 
After analyzing the baseline corruption model (3), I find it important to broaden it by 
including more explanatory variables. This might reduce the omitted variable bias. Taking 
into consideration the example of Ukraine, I am interested in examining whether the same 
corruption causing factors are prevalent in other countries. In order to find it out, the 
corruption model (3) will be extended by three other factors of impact: tax complexity, 
political competition and culture. The final extended version of the corruption model is 
presented below (3a): 
 𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡, (3a) 
where TP is Tax payments (number); 
 PP is Political pluralism - a measure for political competition; 
 DC is Cultural dummy variable. 
 
As has been hypothesized in the subchapter 3.1.5., corruption in tax administration is 
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caused by tax complexity. For the measure of tax complexity I use “Tax payments 
(number)” indicator produced by the World Bank. This indicator covers all mandatory 
taxes and contributions payable by businesses to the government. Countries with smaller 
number of mandatory taxes are supposed to have less complex tax systems. 
Political pluralism in the regression (3a) defines free competition among political 
groups and freedom of expression of different opinions. According to Dahl (1978) 
pluralism is a synonym to “diversity”. Political pluralism is thus a constitutive feature of a 
democratic regime. The indicator of Political pluralism belongs to the category “Electoral 
process and pluralism” of the Democracy Index produced by Economist Intelligence Unit. 
Their methodology rates separately categories on a scale from zero to ten and then 
provides explanation on the overall Democracy Index. The index categorizes countries in 
four regime types
4
. For this reason, I believe that the higher the scores of the “Electoral 
process and pluralism” category moves countries closer to democratic states, resulting in 
higher level of political freedom and political diversification. 
To finalize the extended corruption model (3a) I will additionally include cultural 
dummies. Cultural differences are often analyzed in a relationship with corruption and 
government performance (Treisman, 2000; Paldam, 2002; Teobaldelli, 2011). 
Moreover, referring to an article of Woronowycz (2003 : 1) a big share of Ukrainian 
population accepts bribes and corruption as a normal part of everyday life. In people’s 
opinion, additional payment for a government service is tolerable. Moreover, the article 
underlines that many Ukrainians are so used to bribe-giving so they no longer distinguish 
what is a bribe when paying for free services. For this reason I will also control for cultural 
differences among countries in order to see whether corruption is dependent on the culture. 
To create cultural dummies I used the classification of countries made by the World 
Bank namely “List of countries by region”. In fact, this list takes into consideration not 
only the geographical location of countries but also levels of their income. As a result, 
many countries in Western Europe, Northern America, Middle East and Asia are attached 
to the list of High-income economies without any geographical belonging. In order to get 
cultural diversification, I have made several changes. As most of the citizens of Western 
Europe, Northern America, Australia and New Zealand have similar European origin and 
consequently cultural aspects, I put them in one group. The high-income countries from the 
remaining parts of the world I put into the groups of their geographical location (i.e. 
                                                 
4 “Full democracies” (8.0 to 10), “flawed democracies” (6.0 to 7.9), “hybrid regimes” (4.0 to 5.9), and “authoritarian regimes” (0 to 3.9).  
Source: https://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf 
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Singapore and United Arab Emirates will go consequently to “South-East Asia and 
Pacific” and “Middle East and North Africa” groups). 
4.1.2. Business model 
Considering the statements of several reports about business condition in Ukraine, I 
want to check whether the factors like good educational system and big domestic market 
indeed have a positive impact on business development. Moreover, since corruption is 
defined as the biggest obstacle for doing business, it will be also included in the baseline 
regression of the business model (4): 
 𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑇𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡,  (4) 
where ND is New business density or the number of newly registered companies; 
 C is corruption level as previously; 
 CE is Compulsory education in years; 
 TG is Tertiary graduates; 
 PD is Population density. 
 
The dependent variable of the business model (4) is “New business density” 
indicator produced by the World Bank. This indicator reflects the number of newly 
registered companies each year across countries with limited liability per 1000 working-
age people. Moreover, “New business density” assesses how regulatory, political and 
macroeconomic institutional changes affect new business registration (World DataBank). 
A similar dependent variable is used also in other studies. For instance, Fritsch and 
Mueller (2007) use data on start-up rates in order to investigate the determinants of 
regional start-up formation in West Germany within a certain time period. Their dependent 
variable is calculated by dividing the number of start-ups per period by the number of 
persons in the regional workforce at the beginning of the respective period including 
unemployed individuals (Fritsch and Mueller, 2007). 
Another study, conducted by Wennekers et al. (2005), describes the relationship 
between the rate of entrepreneurial dynamics and the level of economic development 
among countries. Wennekers et al. apply a rate of “nascent entrepreneurship” namely the 
percentage of working age population who are actively involved in starting a business. In 
comparison to “New business density” that counts firms, “Nascent entrepreneurship rate” 
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counts entrepreneurs, so I assume that it is a good alternative measure for business 
formation which will be later applied for robustness check in the business model. 
For the corruption variable I use again Control of Corruption index. Educational 
system in the business model (4) is explained with an indicator of duration of compulsory 
education and yearly number of tertiary graduates. In accordance with the United Nations, 
tertiary graduates are people who have successfully completed an education program in 
higher educational institutions. Data on both indicators is taken from UNESCO Institute 
for Statistics. 
The next variable - Population density - is suitable to apply when controlling for 
country’s domestic market size. The indicator of Population density is taken from the 
database of the World Bank and it shows a yearly amount of people living in a square 
kilometer of a country’s land area. 
After regressing the baseline business model (4), the next step is to add one by one 
control variables and analyze the cross-country results. In this manner, the final version of 
extended business model (4a) is shown below: 
𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝜂0 + 𝜂1𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂2𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂3𝑇𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂4𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂5𝐷𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂6𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂7𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂8𝑅𝐿𝑖𝑡 +
𝑢𝑖𝑡, (4a) 
where DC is Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP); 
 T is Trade (% of GDP); 
 TP is Tax payments; 
 RL is Rule of Law indicator that reflects the level of property rights protection. 
 
The indicator of “Domestic credit to private sector” supplied by the World Bank is 
used in order to analyze how essential external finances are in business activity. The 
indicator reflects the amount of diverse repayable financial resources provided to private 
sector by various financial corporations. The amount of domestic credit is reported as a 
share of GDP. 
Next indicator of the extended business model (4a) is Trade which is also obtained 
from the World Bank database. The indicator includes total amount of exports and imports 
of goods and services in each country and presents the result in a percentage of GDP. This 
ratio is often called “trade openness” ratio and its aggregate value reflects countries' 
integration into the world economy (OECD, 2011). 
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As one may notice, two latter indicators are already used in the corruption model 
(3a). Nevertheless, I include them in the business model also because they both are 
expected to influence business activity. In this regression (4a) Rule of Law indicator is 
supposed to reflect the perceptions about private and intellectual property rights protection, 
quality of contract enforcement and likelihood of property confiscation. The number of tax 
payments in this specification works as the measure of tax complexity and shows its 
impact on business. 
The data for the corruption model is collected from approximately 160 countries over 
the time period 2005-2013. In contrast, the business model analyzes about 80 countries 
over the period of 2005-2012. Both models are performed on the unbalanced datasets 
because each country from the dataset is not observed in all time periods. The number of 
countries and years depends on the data availability. Accordingly, countries with missing 
data are removed from the analysis. 
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the unbalanced panel data. Moreover, all the 
indicators that are used in both models are briefly summarized in Table 2. 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variable 
Number of 
observations 
Missing 
values 
Minimum Mean Maximum 
Standard 
deviation 
Year 1934 0 2005 2009 2013 2.5811 
Country 1934 0 0 106.99 214 62.077 
CC 1857 77 0 50.472 100 28.821 
RL 1879 55 0 50.428 100 28.768 
DF 1619 315 0 0.14268 1 0.3498 
GDP 1698 236 1 945.98 1891 545.9 
TP 1607 327 3 30.714 147 20.425 
PP 830 1104 0.86 5.5084 9.93 2.22 
CPI 1186 318 1 4.0351 9.7 2.1177 
ND 899 1024 0.002 3.685 65.848 6.1288 
CE 1571 352 4 9.2973 16 2.0605 
TG 755 1168 11 252520 9135720 822960 
PD 1824 99 0.137 392.01 18942 1880.8 
T 1480 443 22.118 94.451 458.33 53.155 
DC 1517 406 0 758 1516 437.92 
NE 457 1466 1.1 6.3142 32.3 4.749 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
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Table 2. Summary of the indicators’ description 
Index Value description Source / Producer 
Control of 
Corruption index 
Rating on a 0-100 scale, where higher values 
are corresponding to better outcomes. 
The World Bank 
Corruption 
Perception Index 
(old approach used 
before 2012) 
Among zero (highly corrupt) and ten (very 
clean). 
Transparency 
International 
Rule of Law 
Percentile rank: 0 is the lowest rank and 100 
is the highest.  Higher values are associated 
with more judicial autonomy and better 
protection of property rights. 
The World Bank 
Dummy Federal 
Takes the value of one if a country is federal 
and zero otherwise. Moreover, federal state is 
expected to be less decentralized. 
The Forum of 
Federations 
GDP per capita 
Higher values are corresponding to higher 
level of development. 
The World Bank 
Tax payments 
(number) 
Countries with smaller number of mandatory 
taxes are supposed to have less complex tax 
systems. 
The World Bank 
Political pluralism 
Rating on a 0-10 scale, where a value of 10 
characterizes high political pluralism.  
Economist 
Intelligence Unit 
New business 
density 
The higher the density of newly registered 
companies, the more favorable business 
climate there is in the country. 
The World Bank 
Compulsory 
education (duration) 
Longer duration of compulsory education is 
related to better educational system. 
UNESCO Institute 
for Statistics 
Graduates from 
tertiary education 
(number) 
The higher the amount of graduates in a 
country, the higher the level of human capital 
there is. 
UNESCO Institute 
for Statistics 
Population density 
(people per km
2
 of 
land) 
The higher the density of population, the 
bigger the domestic market there is in the 
country. 
The World Bank 
Domestic credit (% 
of GDP) 
Higher amount of domestic credit is supposed 
to stimulate business activity. 
The World Bank 
Trade (% of GDP) 
Higher amounts of export and import are 
expected to facilitate the access of domestic 
companies to foreign markets. 
The World Bank 
Nascent 
Entrepreneurship 
Rate 
Higher rate reflects bigger amount of starting 
entrepreneurs. 
Global 
Entrepreneurship 
Monitor 
 
4.2. Methodological approach used in the models 
The dataset of my thesis covers both cross-sectional and time-series variations, 
consequently panel data analysis is applicable. Basic panel data analysis observes the 
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relationship of the same individuals at two or more points in time (BurkeyAcademy). Even 
though panel data is often difficult to obtain, it allows to observe individual countries over 
time much better and to get consistent estimators in the presence of omitted variables 
(Wooldridge, 2010 : 281).  In comparison to cross-section or time-series, using panel data 
has more benefits (Baltagi, 2003 : 5-9): 
1) It provides more informative data, more variability and less collinearity which 
produces more reliable parameter estimates.  
2) It suggests that countries are heterogeneous. In other words, panel data controls for 
country- and time-invariant variables which prevents the risk of obtaining biased 
results. 
3) It has higher speed of adjustments to economic policy changes. 
4) It allows creating and testing more complicated behavioral models and thus enables 
to measure effects that are not detectible in cross-section or time-series models 
separately. 
Panel data is often analyzed with one of basic models - random effects (RE) or fixed 
effects (FE). According to Wooldridge (2010 : 285-286) a selection of the estimation 
method depends on the nature of unobserved effects and certain features of the observed 
explanatory variable. Moreover, another important issue to consider is whether or not 
unobserved component is uncorrelated with the observed explanatory variables. 
Nevertheless, the easiest way for making the choice is to conduct Hausman test that is 
based on the difference between the FE and RE estimators (Baltagi, 2003 : 20). 
4.2.1. Hausman test 
Hausman test examines a model with both FE and RE methods and provides a 
solution on which method to use. Null-hypothesis of the test tells to run RE model, 
alternative hypothesis tells that the results from the RE model are likely to be biased. In 
this case, FE model should be used. Null-hypothesis is rejected when p-value is lower than 
critical, and thus fixed effects model is applied. 
Consequently, for both baseline models I conducted the Hausman test using R 
statistical software. The p-value for both models resulted in significant level, lower than 
critical value of 0.05. Hence, the null-hypothesis is rejected because RE is inconsistent so 
fixed effects is applicable. For this reason I will not discuss random effects method but 
focus rather on the FE. 
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4.2.2. Fixed effects 
A FE framework allows for an arbitrary dependence between the unobserved 
component and the observed explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2010 : 286). The FE 
estimator is based on time variation within each individual category (Aslaksen, 2011). 
Because each category, like countries, has its own individual characteristics, it is assumed 
that something within a country can bias the outcome, and hence it has to be controlled for. 
A benefit of FE model is that it may eliminate unobserved characteristics if they are 
time-invariant, so it allows assessing the net effect of the explanatory variables on the 
outcome (Torres-Reyna, 2007). As a result, FE method is especially suitable in this thesis 
for estimating corruption that depends on time invariant heterogeneity differences among 
countries. For this reason omitted variable problem is unavoidable (Swaleheen, 2011 :  24). 
In contrast, using OLS estimation in this case will result in omitted variable bias, because 
if unobserved effects are not treated properly, they cause correlation between coefficients 
and error term (N’zue, 2006). However, FE model does not eliminate omitted variable bias 
if unobservable factors change over time within categories (Blumenstock). 
Another reason to use FE method for my analysis is due to endogeneity of 
corruption. According to Barreto (2001) corruption is “endogenous result of a country’s 
institutional development”. Moreover, Swaleheen (2011 : 24) also points out that 
corruption is endogenously determined because it usually correlates with exogenous 
shocks. For this reason FE estimator is a good choice because it could resolve endogeneity 
problem (Frèchette, 2006). 
Elimination of both the endogeneity problem and the source of omitted variable bias 
in the FE model can be performed using deviations-from-means estimator, or so-called 
“within estimator” (Angrist and Pischke, 2008 : 167). The within transformation is 
accomplished in several steps. First, the original equations are averaged over time and thus 
a cross sectional equation is obtained. Second, the averaged equation is subtracted from the 
original one. Finally, a new transformed equation does not contain any unobserved effect 
(Wooldridge, 2010 : 302). As a result, the explanation of Blumenstock provides an 
important argument, he states: “the fixed effect coefficients soak up all the across-group 
action. What is left over is the within-group action and it greatly reduces the threat of 
omitted variable bias”. 
It follows that FE regression holds constant average effects of each data category, i.e. 
country in the case of this thesis. Consequently, coefficients in FE model tell how much 
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each observation differs from the average; namely, FE regression reports the average 
within-group effect. Additionally, FE regressions are particularly important to use when 
data is categorized, because it can be tricky to control for all characteristics of the 
categories (Blumenstock). 
However, FE method has a significant drawback. If observed explanatory variables 
do not vary over time for a country, they are identical to zero for all time periods and hence 
they are dropped from the observation (Wooldridge, 2010 : 304-307; Poprawe, 2014). 
Consequently, variables like population density tend to be rather time-invariant. However, 
in contrast, pooled OLS estimator neglects country specific characteristics (Aslaksen, 2011 
: 13) and ignores the panel structure of the data (Schmidheiny, 2014b). Thereby, FE is 
better to use when it is important to obtain an impact of variables that vary over time. 
In a number of panel data studies about corruption some authors include year- and 
country-fixed effects. Year-fixed effects account for factors that change over time but are 
still common for all countries (Urga, 2001). According to Aslaksen (2011) and Dal Bó and 
Rossi (2006), year-fixed effects allow to control for unobserved shocks and measure the 
efficiency impact of sector-level shifts over time that are suspected to affect all countries in 
the same way.  
In contrast, country-fixed effects allow controlling for the average observable and 
unobservable differences across countries (Blumenstock). In the study of Dal Bó and Rossi 
(2006) country fixed-effects are included in order to control for potential biases caused by 
any omitted variables that are country specific and time-invariant. Aslaksen (2011) and 
Cameron and Miller (2013) include country-fixed effects for controlling for a within-
country correlation. 
It is particularly important to remark that transformations used in order to control for 
fixed effects may eliminate much of useful information in the variable of interest (Angrist 
and Pischke, 2008 : 168). In other words, including country- and/or year-fixed effects can 
mess up the results because they can absorb too much variation in the data leaving too little 
variation for explaining the variables (BurkeyAcademy). 
All the procedures mentioned above I accomplish in R software. The package plm is 
especially designed for linear panel data and it also supports unbalanced panels. The fixed 
effects estimator is calculated with a model option “within” which also allows using 
“twoway” effect for taking into consideration both country- and year-fixed effects. The 
Hausman test is conducted using pht syntax (Croissant et al., 2015). 
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4.2.3. Instrumental variable and 2SLS estimator 
Since both models (3 and 4) in this thesis include corruption, they become 
interdependent. Consequently, corruption in the right hand side of the model (4) is 
endogenous, thus it must be instrumented. The most common way to correct for 
endogeneity problem apart from FE is instrumental variable technic (IV). Although, in 
panel data the endogeneity can be eliminated without applying IV (Zivot, 2012), there is an 
evidence from Frèchette (2006) where both methods are used. The reason is that FE can 
solve endogeneity problem only in the case if it results from time-invariant factors 
(Frèchette, 2006). Otherwise, instrumental variable technic should be used. Another reason 
to use IV in this thesis is to find a causal effect of corruption on business, in other words, 
to be confident whether it is actually corruption influencing business. 
As maintained in econometric literature, the choice of a proper instrumental variable 
is fundamental. First of all, IV should be correlated with the endogenous variable. 
Secondly, IV cannot have any direct impact on dependent variable and thirdly, it should 
not correlate with the error term in the equation of interest (Treisman, 1998). According to 
Kolstad (2014 : 56) and Stephenson (2015), a valid IV should not affect the outcome 
variable in any way except through its impact on the endogenous explanatory variable. 
Stephenson (2015) adds that this effect cannot be tested statistically and the best way to 
make the IV choice is to be confident about the correlations based on “substantive 
knowledge of the area and general common sense”. 
It can be seen from the researches of Gupta et al. (2001 : 750) and Attila (2008 : 15) 
that there are several instruments for corruption that were used in a number of cross-
section studies. For instance, the most common instruments are: ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization, French and British legal origin, distance from equator and the mortality 
rate among settlers etc. However, these variables are time-invariant and in FE model their 
effects are not estimated. 
Having considered instruments for corruption in cross-section data, it is reasonable to 
look at time series data. According to Wadsworth, in the latter one lagged values of 
endogenous variables can be used as possible instruments because lagged values are 
unlikely to be affected by current shocks. Moreover, in the panel data of Gupta et al. (2001 
: 762) lagged values of a corruption index are indeed used as the instrument. For this 
reason, my IV choice is also a lagged value of the main corruption index. I assume that CC 
value lagged by one period is the exogenous instrument and it does not have any impact on 
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present business formation other than through the impact on current corruption level. 
According to Wooldridge, the most efficient IV estimator is the Two-Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS) estimator. 2SLS requires at least as many instruments as there are 
endogenous variables (Murray, 2006). For the endogenous corruption in this thesis I use 
only one IV, thus the equation of interest is exactly identified. The equation of interest is 
the business model (4a) which is used for performing two stages for 2SLS estimation: 
1) Estimating corruption by regressing it on the instrumental variable (Z) and the ex-
ogenous variables (Wit) from the extended business model (4a): 
 ?̂?𝑖𝑡 = µ0 + µ1𝑊𝑖𝑡 + µ2𝑍 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (5) 
2) Substituting the endogenous corruption with its predicted value (?̂?𝑖𝑡) in the business 
regression (4a): 
 𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1?̂?𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑2𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (6) 
As a result, the indicator of lagged corruption (Z) is assumed to correlate with 
corruption (?̂?𝑖𝑡) at the first stage and moreover, Z is assumed to be uncorrelated with 𝑒𝑖𝑡 at 
the second stage. If IV is good enough it is possible to estimate the causal effect of the 
regressor on the dependent variable (Schmidheiny, 2014a). 
In R software instrumental variable estimation for panel data is obtained with “bvk” 
method using two-part formulas (Croissant, 2015 : 41). This method is based on Balestra-
Varadharajan-Krishnakumar's (1987) study who offer an alternative specifications of 
2SLS, namely “generalized” 2SLS estimator. In R software the outcome of “bvk” method 
provides the result of the second stage, whereas the first stage is not reported. For this 
reason I cannot be completely confident about the validity of the lagged corruption as the 
instrument. In case if it is weak, 2SLS estimates can be biased. 
4.2.4. Cluster-robust standard errors 
In comparison to cross-section or time-series data, the problems like 
heteroscedasticity or serial correlation are rare in panel data and do not usually lead to 
dramatic changes. However, an important issue that has to be considered is standard errors. 
The standard errors of FE estimator are often underestimated in the presence of serial 
correlation (Schmidheiny, 2014b : 9). For this reason, in order to allow for 
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heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, cluster-robust standard errors are recommended to 
use (Schmidheiny, 2014b : 11). It is important to distinguish that clustered standard errors 
method helps to deal with autocorrelation, whereas robust standard errors (White-Huber 
standard errors) deals with heteroscedasticity. 
Evidence in support of clustering can be found in the study of Bertrand et al. (2004). 
They use Differences-in-Differences estimator and notice that standard errors often 
understate the standard deviation of the estimator. This leads to serious overestimation of t-
statistics, so resulting standard errors are inconsistent. Hence, some variables may look 
significant when they are actually insignificant. Thereby, Bertrand et al. (2004 : 254) deal 
with this problem by clustering standard errors. They explain that after clustering findings 
may not be as significant as previously thought if the outcome variables in a study are 
serially correlated. 
Additionally, Angrist and Pischke (2008 : 231-233) clarify that clustering has a big 
impact on standard errors with variable group sizes and in case when a generic measure of 
the correlation of regressors within groups is large. Clustering is essential when the 
regressor of interest is fixed within groups. Moreover, according to Dal Bó and Rossi 
(2007), it is important to cluster because the shocks affecting business activity in a country 
in the same year may be correlated. Consequently, they use country-year clustered standard 
errors. 
An equally significant aspect of cluster-robust standard errors is a question what to 
cluster over. Cameron and Miller (2013 : 21) advocate that larger and fewer clusters have 
more bias but less variability. The solution is to avoid bias and to use bigger and more 
aggregate clusters if possible. The example provided by the authors analyzes a dataset on 
countries and states. In this case, clustering at the country level is not recommended 
because it can lead to incorrect inference if there is a within-state cross-country correlation 
of the regressors and errors. Hence, clustering at a broader level, like states, is suggested. 
There is also, however, a further point to be considered, clustered standard errors 
have two disadvantages (Cameron and Miller, 2013 : 6). First, they may reduce the 
precision of estimate of parameter value. Second, the standard estimator for the variance of 
parameter is usually biased downward from the true variance. The latter issue can be fixed 
after computing cluster-robust standard errors. 
It is essential to emphasize that cluster-robust standard errors in panel data are 
usually way much larger than default standard errors, although it is possible for cluster-
robust errors to be slightly smaller compared to the default standard errors (Cameron and 
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Miller, 2013 : 9-20). Cameron and Miller (2013 : 21) note that cluster-robust standard 
errors must be always compared to default ones and if there is a considerable difference 
then the former ones are recommended to use. 
Taking into consideration the example in Angrist’s and Pischke’s book (2008 : 231), 
I assume that corruption outcome in some countries can be correlated because those 
countries share similar background characteristics. In addition, corruption level varies 
more across countries than over time (Aslacksen : 16), consequently, standard errors may 
increase. Hence, in order to obtain properly estimated t-statistics, I use “Cluster-robust 
Huber/White standard errors” reported with the lmtest package in R software. In this thesis 
clustering is done over a group (country) level because the number of country-clusters is 
bigger than the number of year-clusters. Moreover, I apply HC0 heteroskedasticity-
consistent estimator because other estimators are suggested to improve the performance in 
small samples (Zeileis : 4-5).  
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5. Results of the hypothesized assumptions 
In this chapter I examine empirically the models and provide the results first, on the 
relationship between corruption and its drivers (Table 3) and second, on the relationship 
between business activity and corruption including other influencing factors (Table 4). One 
may notice, that both tables do not display any constant term (intercept). The reason is due 
to FE methodology that uses deviations from the individual means where the intercepts 
vanishes (Hauser, 2014/2015). In addition, in both tables the initial number of countries is 
shown in the first columns, although this number steadily declines as the set of variables is 
broadened. Furthermore, country- and year-fixed effects are included in in all 
specifications in both tables though not reported. 
Table 3 presents the FE estimator results concerning the corruption drivers. In the 
first four columns I use Control of Corruption index as the dependent variable and in the 
sixth column I apply Corruption Perception Index instead. Additionally, following the 
advice of Cameron and Miller (2013 : 21), I compared the default standard errors to the 
cluster-robust standard errors and the difference between them is indeed noticeable. This 
implies that it is better to use the cluster-robust standard errors. 
The first column of the Table 3 shows the baseline corruption model (3). As can be 
seen, the regressors of Rule of Law and GDP per capita are both highly significant. In this 
case, when Rule of Law indicator increases by a point, Control of Corruption index also 
increases on average across countries by 0.406 points over time period 2005-2013, 
meaning that with more judicial autonomy corruption level is lower. This result is in the 
line with the hypothesis H1. 
However, the other two coefficients in the column (1) do not reflect previously 
hypothesized results. An increase of 1% in GDP per capita correlates with higher 
corruption level as CC index decreases by 0.157 points. Moreover, the baseline model 
shows that in the federal countries CC index is 0.278 points higher in comparison to other 
countries, but there is no support for it because the relationship is insignificant. The 
outcome of the first column can be driven by omitted variable bias. 
In order to minimize possible omitted variable bias, the next step is to add control 
variables and check the changes in the significance levels. The following columns of the 
Table 3 display the extended version of the corruption model (3a). Thereby, the column (2) 
controls for the complexity of tax systems which is represented with the number of tax 
payments. The coefficients 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 do not change much, but the significance of GDP per 
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capita slightly declines and its coefficient doubles. What is more, an increase of total 
number of tax payments by one extra payment raises CC index by 0.040 on average among 
countries. The statistical significance of the coefficient 𝛽4 is rather high, implying that on 
average more tax payments lead to lower corruption level which conflicts with the 
hypothesis H5. In this case the assumption that the number of tax payments and the 
corruption level have a linear relationship must be wrong. For this reason I include a 
quadratic version of the number of tax payments in order to indicate a non-linear 
relationship. 
Certainly the relationship is non-linear as the quadratic coefficient is significant. 
After adding tax-squared in the next specification two tax coefficients cannot be 
interpreted separately. The form of the relationship is revealed from the signs of their 
coefficients. The column (3) shows that the coefficient for the number of tax payments is 
positive, whereas the squared coefficient is negative. This result could be also represented 
with a concave curve. This suggests that having relatively few tax payments has a positive 
effect on the corruption index until a turning point is reached. After this point the number 
of tax payments has a negative impact on CC as the function starts to decrease. 
Consequently, the countries with more tax payments have lower corruption index. In other 
words, more complex tax system is associated with higher corruption level which is in the 
line with the hypothesis H5. 
In the next column (4) I control for impact of political decentralization on corruption 
across countries. The numbers of years and observations have considerably shrunk due to a 
shortage of data on each country. Nevertheless, one point increase in Political pluralism 
measure is associated with 0.394 points increase in CC index on average overtime. As a 
result, countries with more diversified political systems have lower corruption – just like 
expected in H4. Including the measure of Political pluralism does not change much the 
result for Rule of Law, but the impacts of GDP per capita and tax complexity on corruption 
become non-significant. 
In order to check whether corruption can be driven by cultural differences I include 
cultural dummies in the column (5). The "Africa" group is used as the reference category 
because by default R sorts the levels of a factor alphabetically. As the intercept term is 
absent, it is impossible to define any group-specific mean value. Thereby, the coefficient 
for Asian countries is not the effect of the group, it is the difference between the effect of 
Asian and African countries. The same pattern applies to all other dummy groups. 
Accordingly, the CC index in all other countries is lower in comparison to Africa’s. 
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However, this may not be true as the result is insignificant. 
Table 3. Corruption drivers 
 
  
Dependent variable  Corruption 
CC CC CC CC CC CPI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Rule of Law 
0.406*** 
(0.027) 
0.408*** 
(0.022) 
0.405*** 
(0.215) 
0.519*** 
(0.057) 
0.524*** 
(0.058) 
0.027** 
(0.008) 
Dummy federal 
0.278 
(3.231) 
0.257 
(3.093) 
0.230 
(3.069) 
1.642 
(2.552) 
1.498 
(2.508) 
0.241
#
 
(0.130) 
Log (GDP per 
capita) 
-0.157*** 
(0.042) 
-0.080* 
(0.040) 
-0.103* 
(0.047) 
0.052 
(0.124) 
0.107 
(0.097) 
0.012* 
(0.006) 
Tax payments 
(number) 
 
0.040** 
(0.013) 
0.040** 
(0.013) 
0.025 
(0.024) 
0.023 
(0.025) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Tax payments 
(number) - squared 
  
-0.000
# 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Political pluralism    
0.394** 
(0.143) 
0.398** 
(0.143) 
-0.075* 
(0.031) 
Africa     
reference 
category 
reference 
category 
North America, 
Western Europe, 
Australia, New 
Zealand 
    
-0.204 
(0.515) 
-0.048 
(0.051) 
South-East Asia 
and Pacific 
    
-0.134 
(0.469) 
-0.019 
(0.052) 
Latin America and 
Carribean 
    
-0.369 
(0.387) 
0.051 
(0.053) 
Central and 
Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia 
    
-0.650 
(0.613) 
0.031 
(0.058) 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
    
-0.636 
(0.773) 
0.027 
(0.044) 
Twoway effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R-Squared 0.106 0.104 0.105 0.170 0.172 0.100 
Adj. R-Squared 0.094 0.091 0.092 0.132 0.133 0.072 
Number of years 2005-2013 2005-2013 2005-2013 
2006, 2008, 
2010-2012 
2006, 2008, 
2010-2012 
2006, 2008, 
2010-2011 
Number of 
countries 
179 179 179 160 160 157 
Observations 1568 1534 1534 768 768 603 
 
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘#’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Unbalanced Panel data. High rank of corruption indices indicates low level of corruption. 
Fixed effects (within) models.  
Twoway effects include year- and country-fixed effects. 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Disturbance terms are clustered at the country level. 
Column (6) uses CPI as dependent variable. 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
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The robustness of the results is tested using another corruption index – CPI. Due to 
the changes of CPI methodology in 2012, the newer index values cannot be compared to 
the old ones. For this reason I exclude the data for the periods starting from 2012. The final 
column (6) of the Table 3 indicates that the strongest correlation with corruption still has 
the judicial autonomy. Political pluralism is less significant as before and its coefficient is 
close to zero on the negative side. This indicates that more political competition results in 
slightly higher corruption levels which now conflicts with the hypothesis H4. Moreover, 
the robustness check shows a significant correlation between GDP per capita and CPI that 
is in line with the hypothesized expectation H2. It follows that a percentage change in GDP 
per capita is associated with an increase in CPI by 0.012 points. Furthermore, a weakly 
significant correlation is observed between corruption and federal dummy. Although the 
outcome still does not support the hypothesis H3, it indicates that in the federal states CC 
is 0.241 point higher, thus corruption level is slightly lower compared to other countries. 
Moreover, the relationship between culture and corruption still remains insignificant. 
After all control variables are added and robustness check is done I conclude that the 
most significant driver of corruption among countries is lack of judicial autonomy. 
Columns (1) to (6) indicate that an increase in Rule of Law indicator by one point is 
associated with a rise in the corruption rank (lower corruption level) of about 0.027 to 
0.524 on average among countries. This result fully conforms to the first hypothesis H1. 
The impact of GPD per capita on corruption is rather unclear. Even though in the 
columns (4) and (5) the coefficients are insignificant, the final specification (6) supports a 
significant positive relationship between GDP per capita and the corruption index. 
However, it is hard to define from these findings whether low GDP per capita is a 
corruption driver or otherwise. 
It is important to summarize that the competition between politicians has rather a 
positive correlation with the corruption index as was found in the columns (4) and (5). The 
dissimilarity in the outcome of the final specification could be explained due to the 
differences in the methodologies between two corruption indices. CPI measures corruption 
perceptions only in public sector – among public officials and politicians, whereas CC 
analyzes broader data sources in both public and private sectors. 
Finally, it appears to be that on average among countries decentralization and tax 
complexity do not have any impact on corruption. However, the insignificance of federal 
dummy could be caused by one of FE drawbacks. As there is almost no change in dummy 
values across years, they are probably not taken into consideration. The cultural difference 
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also does not support the expectation that one culture is more corrupt than another. 
Having considered the drivers of corruption, it is also reasonable to look at the 
second question of my thesis. In order to answer whether corruption harms business, I first 
of all check for the association between corruption and business activity (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. Corruption and New business density 
Source: Compiled by author 
Figure 3 plots both corruption indices against the indicator of New business density 
for all countries in the sample. The upward-sloping trend lines illustrate that countries with 
higher corruption index (less corruption) tend to have higher density of newly registered 
businesses per 1000 working age people. Whereas more corrupt economies have lower 
new business densities. However, this result cannot be realistic without additional controls. 
For this reason, Table 4 provides the answer about the impact of corruption on business 
activity and shows how other factors influence the amount of new business registration 
worldwide. 
Table 4 shows the results of the business model. The first column demonstrates the 
baseline (4) regression and the columns from (2) to (8) represent the extended regression 
(4a). As before, the main corruption measure is CC index, CPI is used only for the 
robustness check in the column (6). 
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The construction of the first column (1) represents the factors that are expected to 
facilitate the private business development and as corruption is the variable of interest, it is 
also included in this specification. As observed from this column, one point change in CC 
index increases the density of new businesses by 0.012 points on average among countries 
over 2005-2012. However, this result is insignificant. Moreover, neither the amount of 
tertiary graduates nor trade has significant impact on New business density. At the same 
time, years of compulsory education and population density are weakly correlated with 
newly registered businesses across 92 countries. In other words, an additional compulsory 
year of schooling is associated with an increase in the density of registered businesses by 
0.277. And what is more, in countries where population density is 1% higher, the density 
of newly registered firms is 0.104 lower. Both of these results are in line with the 
hypotheses H7 and H9. It is important however not to overemphasis the strengths of these 
results as this association is rather driven by omitted factors. 
Starting from the second column I modify the baseline specification by adding 
control variables. After controlling for financial aid in starting business activity, one 
percentage point change in the amount of domestic credit results in a slight 0.020 increase 
in New business density across countries over 2005-2012 period. To put it differently, 
countries with higher amount of financial resources provided to private sector have on 
average higher density of newly registered businesses. This outcome supports the 
hypothesis H11 and is the only one statistically significant in this specification. 
The next column (3) demonstrates additionally the impact of tax complexity which 
has the same level of statistical significance as the domestic credit. Basically, if the amount 
of tax payments in business increases by one extra payment, the density of newly 
registered firms decreases by 0.009, just as expected in the hypothesis H12. The correlation 
between domestic credit and business is similar to the previous result. Moreover, the 
correlation of schooling years and business density is again weakly significant and it 
remains positive. 
Controlling for the legal aspect almost does not change the results. The column (4) 
shows that better property rights protection is negatively associated with New business 
density, but the relationship is not statistically significant. The rest of the coefficients in 
this specification remain almost unchanged. 
As can be seen so far the corruption index does not show any significant impact on 
the business formation. This could be caused if all the correlation is absorbed by the 
controls. For this reason I suggest to exclude corruption from the business regression and 
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check the outcome. Hence, the column (5) shows that excluding corruption does not 
change the result. As before, only compulsory education, domestic credit and tax 
complexity have significant impact on the density of new businesses across countries. 
Table 4. Factors influencing business formation 
Dependent 
variable New Business Density 
Nascent 
Entrepre- 
neurship Rate 
New 
Business 
Density 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Corruption 0.012 
(0.019) 
0.017 
(0.020) 
0.015 
(0.021) 
0.024 
(0.024) 
 
0.046 
(0.075) 
0.095* 
(0.044) 
0.577
#
 
(0.339) 
Compulsory 
education 
(years) 
0.277
#
 
(0.162) 
0.275 
(0.170) 
0.288
#
 
(0.160) 
0.313
#
 
(0.160) 
0.319* 
(0.160) 
0.0289 
(0.064) 
0.298** 
(0.104) 
0.382 
(0.306) 
Log (Tertiary 
graduates) 
-0.031 
(0.083) 
0.003 
(0.043) 
-0.035 
(0.044) 
-0.034 
(0.044) 
-0.030 
(0.043) 
0.002 
(0.067) 
-0.041 
(0.053) 
0.081 
(0.139) 
Log 
(Population 
density) 
-0.104
#
 
(0.053) 
0.049 
(0.046) 
0.039 
(0.052) 
0.033 
(0.048) 
0.040 
(0.053) 
0.014 
(0.053) 
-0.172* 
(0.086) 
0.134 
(0.135) 
Trade (% of 
GDP) 
0.007 
(0.008) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
0.009 
(0.009) 
0.044* 
(0.017) 
0.047 
(0.033) 
Domestic 
credit (% of 
GDP) 
 
0.020** 
(0.008) 
0.017* 
(0.007) 
0.018** 
(0.007) 
0.018* 
(0.007) 
0.018* 
(0.009) 
0.005
#
 
(0.003) 
0.013 
(0.014) 
Tax payments 
(number) 
  
-0.009* 
(0.004) 
-0.010* 
(0.005) 
-0.010* 
(0.004) 
-0.015 
(0.010) 
-0.047* 
(0.021) 
0.024 
(0.022) 
Rule of Law 
   
-0.030 
(0.026) 
-0.022 
(0.022) 
-0.021 
(0.022) 
-0.056 
(0.035) 
0.296 
(0.193) 
Corruption 
index used 
CC CC CC CC CC CPI CC CC 
Twoway 
effects 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R-Squared 0.024 0.053 0.062 0.066 0.063 0.056 0.100 0.001 
Adj. R- 
Squared 
0.019 0.041 0.047 0.050 0.048 0.042 0.071 0.000 
Number of 
countries 
92 90 90 90 90 84 62 90 
Number of 
years 
2005-
2012 
2005-
2012 
2005-
2012 
2005-
2012 
2005-
2012 
2005-
2011 
2005-2013 
2005-
2012 
Observations 489 462 455 455 455 401 266 455 
 
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘#’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Unbalanced Panel data. High rank of corruption indices indicates low level of corruption. 
Fixed effects (within) models. 
Twoway effects include year- and country-fixed effects. 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Disturbance terms are clustered at the country level. 
Column (5) excludes the corruption index. 
Column (6) uses CPI corruption index.  
Column (7) uses Nascent Entrepreneurship Rate as the dependent variable. 
Column (8) uses 2SLS estimator where one period lagged value of CC index is the instrumental variable. 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
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In order to validate the previous findings, the next steps are the robustness checks 
using another corruption index and another dependent variable. Applying CPI as an 
alternative corruption index in the column (6) provides similar to the column’s (2) results. 
The only significant factor that determines new business registration activity in this 
specification is domestic credit which has similar correlation with business formation as 
previously. Furthermore, corruption still does not have any statistically significant 
influence on new business formation across countries. 
The further point to be considered is robustness check with a new dependent variable 
Nascent Entrepreneurship Rate. The corruption variable in this regression is as before - 
Control of Corruption index. After applying Nascent Entrepreneurship Rate, the results 
change considerably. Column (7) shows that one point change in CC index is correlated 
with a 0.095 higher rate of nascent entrepreneurs. This means that the share of starting 
entrepreneurs is on average higher in the countries with lower corruption levels. 
Statistically significant outcome of the corruption coefficient could be due to the fact that 
the amount of countries in this specification has considerably diminished and the impact of 
corruption is stronger in the countries which are in this shorter set. 
Moreover, in this specification trade has also shown a statistically significant impact 
on Nascent Entrepreneurship Rate. One percentage point change in the trade coefficient is 
associated with 0.044 point increase in the rate of starting entrepreneurs. This gives a 
chance to believe that better access to foreign markets may facilitate domestic business 
activity. In addition, other variables become more or less significant in comparison to the 
previous columns. However, the amount of tertiary graduates as before does not seem like 
having any significant impact of business. 
Noting the compelling nature of the evidence in columns from (1) to (7), the analysis 
is subject to endogeneity and possibility of measurement errors. To correct for these, I use 
the instrumental variable in the final regression. Taking into consideration the study of 
Gupta et al. (2001 : 762) where corruption is instrumented with its lagged values, it is 
worth mentioning that this instrument is not perfect. Due to the reason that corruption level 
does not change much over a short time period, its previous values however might 
influence a present-day business formation. Nevertheless, as a valid instrument is not easy 
to find, I proceed in a similar way as Gupta et al. (2001). Since the main corruption index 
in this thesis is Control of Corruption, I assume that one period lagged value of this index 
is a valid instrument, thus 2SLS estimation is expected to yield consistent estimates. 
In the column (8) I re-estimate the extended business model (4a) treating the values 
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of corruption as endogenous. Obviously, the dependent variable is once again New 
business density. After Control of Corruption index has been instrumented, the 2SLS 
results conclude that one point increase in CC raises New business density by 0.577 firms 
per 1000 working-age people. That is to say, there is a weakly significant evidence that 
causality runs from corruption to business formation. As a result, on average in countries 
with lower corruption, the density of newly registered firms is higher. This result supports 
the H6 hypothesis which states that corruption negatively affects business. 
Weak significance of the causal relationship between corruption and the density of 
new businesses can be due to the reason that FE model reports the averaged result across 
countries. Apparently, corruption does not affect all the countries in the same way, and 
thus it is not an obstacle for doing business in countries where corruption level is low (high 
corruption indices). Nevertheless, weakly significant but positive relationship between 
corruption and new business formation demonstrates that in less corrupt countries business 
start-ups are more common. 
The results of Table 4 are rather non-robust because the variables which were 
significant become insignificant in the final modification. For instance, neither of the 
coefficients such as the share of domestic credit, the number of tax payments or the years 
of compulsory education is significant. 
In general, based on the analysis of 90 countries I cannot state that higher amount of 
university graduates or better property rights protection may facilitate business activity. 
These two variables did not show any significant impact on business in any specification. 
Such an outcome for Tertiary graduates could be due to the reason explained by Guerrero 
et al. (2008). The aggregate amount of graduates could not result in any statistically 
significant outcome probably because they were not grouped by their majors. Moreover, 
graduation from tertiary institutions itself is often found to be insignificant also in other 
studies (subchapter 3.3.2.) if personal qualities and knowledge are not taken into account. 
In addition, foreign trade and population density rather do not have robust significant 
correlation with business activity. However, the insignificance at any of the usual 
confidence levels of population density could be explained in a way that the variability of 
the values over the observed period is quite rare. Thus, the coefficient is most likely 
neglected in FE estimation. 
It could be said also that the results of both tables could be affected by the limitation 
of FE model. Including twoway effects may have changed the outcome as country- and 
year-fixed effects can absorb a lot of data variation leaving not enough of it to explain the 
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variables (BurkeyAcademy).  
Referring to the tables 3 and 4, it is important to mention also that low values of R-
squared could be explained by the nature of panel data, namely cross-sectional data cannot 
be compared to time-series data without adjustments (Stata services). Although in panel 
data models R-squared is usually low, but excluded explanatory effects of the intercepts in 
FE model can reduce R-squared even more. 
Finally, the results from Table 3 and Table 4 are briefly summarized in Table 5. All 
the findings are compared to the previously hypothesized expectations and presented 
below. 
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Table 5. Summary of the findings 
Hypothe-
ses 
Is the 
expectation met? 
Findings 
H1 
Yes; highly 
significant 
relationship 
Higher judicial autonomy is associated with lower 
corruption. 
H2 
Unclear; rather 
insignificant 
relationship 
At first, higher GDP per capita is associated with higher 
corruption level and the relationship is highly significant. 
After the control variables are added, the relationship 
becomes rather insignificant and an increase in GDP per 
capita starts to correlate with lower corruption level. 
H3 
No, the 
relationship is 
insignificant 
Centralized (federal) countries have lower corruption level, 
but this outcome is rather non-significant. 
H4 
Rather yes; 
statistically 
significant 
relationship 
Stronger competition among political parties is strongly 
correlated with lower corruption level. However, the last 
specification shows the opposite. 
H5 
Rather yes, but 
the relationship is 
insignificant  
The relationship is non-linear but concave. At the beginning 
less complex tax systems are correlated with lower 
corruption level until a turning point is reached. After this 
point, more complex tax systems correlate with higher 
corruption level. 
H6 
Yes, but often 
insignificant 
relationship  
At first, corruption does not show any significant impact on 
business activity, even though lower corruption is associated 
with higher business formation. Finally, weakly significant 
evidence that causality runs from corruption to business 
formation is found. 
H7 
Yes; rather 
significant 
relationship 
More years of education are correlated with higher density 
of business registrations. 
H8 
No, the 
relationship is 
insignificant 
Mostly negative correlation between the amount of tertiary 
graduates and business formation. 
H9 
Rather yes; 
weakly significant 
relationship 
Negative significant correlation between population and 
density of newly registered businesses. 
H10 
Yes, but rather 
non-significant 
relationship 
Positive but mostly insignificant correlation between the 
amount of foreign trade and newly registered businesses.  
H11 
Yes; significant 
relationship 
Positively and statistically significant relationship between 
the amount of domestic credit and business start-ups. 
H12 
Yes; significant 
relationship 
More complex tax systems are associated with lower density 
of business formations in most of the specifications. 
H13 
No; insignificant 
relationship 
Negative association between property rights protection and 
new business formation. 
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6. Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis is to observe corruption and its impact on business in Ukraine 
and in a cross-country perspective in order to find out whether these problems are general 
for all countries. To achieve the goal I first of all defined what corruption is and how it 
affects business in a form of bribery, extortion, patronage and embezzlement. Secondly, I 
observed the features of two main measures of corruption such as Corruption Perception 
Index and Control of Corruption. Thirdly, I provided the facts about the state of corruption 
and business conditions in Ukraine and compared them to the findings in the economic 
literature. At this point a number of hypotheses was set and based on them I constructed 
corruption and business models and thus conducted the econometric analysis. The 
methodological approach of this thesis is based on the panel data where the fixed effects 
model was applied. Moreover, as corruption was stated to be endogenous, its variable was 
instrumented with one period lagged corruption index using 2SLS estimator. 
The findings of this thesis are applicable for a number of countries, however as the 
main idea is driven from the experience of my home country, the conclusion is obviously 
dedicated to the case of Ukraine. 
Based on the cross-country findings of this thesis a lesson for Ukraine can be crucial. 
It has been identified that the most significant drivers of corruption among all the countries 
in the data set are lack of judicial autonomy and weak competition among political parties. 
These two factors have to be taken into consideration by current Ukrainian government 
that is actively trying to eliminate corruption. 
On one hand, Ukrainian president Poroshenko emphasizes complete independence 
for the judicial system, but on the other hand, his new draft legislation has been widely 
criticized because judicial system remains totally dependent on the president. Nevertheless, 
it is important to underline that more independent judicial system is associated with lower 
corruption level. 
The results show that in a number of countries more competition among politicians 
strongly correlates with lower level of corruption. The past of Ukrainian political 
competition is hard to describe as strong, but recently overthrown regime of Yanukovych 
and the election of a completely new government signify rather strengthening of political 
competition. 
Another important lesson Ukraine must consider is that it cannot perform better 
without improving conditions for private sector development. Based on the analysis of 90 
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countries the development of business depends on several factors. One of them is 
corruption and it is found that corruption causes negative impact on business prosperity. It 
is necessary to point out that countries with lower corruption level on average have better 
business activity. 
In addition to corruption, business start-ups are dependent on the availability of 
financial resources and complexity of tax systems. Higher amount of domestic credit 
offered to businesses and less complex tax systems are associated with higher business 
densities in a number of countries. 
In my opinion in order to provide essential amount of financial resources to 
Ukrainian business the National Bank of Ukraine must stabilize the national currency and 
improve the transparency of banking organizations. Concerning the tax system, changes in 
Ukrainian Tax Code should offer less burdensome tax procedures. This might take the 
entrepreneurs out of the shadow activity and facilitate the development of private sector 
and the country in general. 
After all, the final important factor in business formation, even though weakly 
significant, is the years of compulsory education. Not surprising that the more educated the 
nation is, the more probably they will implement new ideas. Luckily in Ukraine eleven 
years of compulsory education is available for everyone completely free of charge. 
However, I believe that the role of education in fighting corruption is also crucial. The 
younger generation is easier to teach how not to be corrupt. Although, educating citizens 
without giving them opportunities for professional development does not favor Ukraine as 
a whole. 
As a result, there are a lot of problems for Ukrainian government to work on and the 
findings made in this thesis are only a small part of them. To eliminate corruption in 
Ukraine in a short run is close to impossible. The conditions for business development also 
need time for improving. This thesis does not give any instructions on those issues. 
However, based on the cross-country analysis I conclude that concentrating at least on 
these findings may somehow improve the prosperity of Ukraine. 
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